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ALTHOUGH THE FIRST DEPT FELT CONSTRAINED BY COURT OF APPEALS PRECEDENT TO DISMISS THIS DOG INJURY CASE SOUNDING IN NEGLIGENCE, THE COURT FORCEFULLY ARGUED THE LAW SHOULD BE CHANGED TO ALLOW SUCH A SUIT.

The First Department, in a substantial opinion by Justice Acosta, reluctantly affirmed Supreme Court’s dismissal of the dog-injury complaint. Defendant tied his 35 pound dog to an unsecured bicycle rack which weighed five pounds. The dog ran off, dragging the rack. Plaintiff’s leg became tangled in the rack, causing him to fall. The First Department followed the Court of Appeals precedent, which allows a dog-injury suit only on vicious propensity/strict liability grounds. The opinion strongly argued the law should be changed to allow dog-injury suits based upon negligence:

Were we not … constrained … we would … permit plaintiffs to pursue their negligence cause of action. To avoid the harshness of the [Court of Appeals] rule, the recognition of the following exception would be appropriate: A dog owner who attaches his or her dog to an unsecured, dangerous object, allowing the dog to drag the object through the streets and cause injury to others, may be held liable in negligence. In these circumstances, negligence liability would be in keeping with the principles of fundamental fairness, responsibility for one’s actions, and societal expectations … — assuming a jury would deem unreasonable defendant’s failure to ensure that the rack was secured before he tied his dog to it. It is not unreasonable to expect dog owners to restrain their dogs in public unless unleashing them is safe or specifically permitted at certain times and locations, as evidenced by local leash laws (see e.g. 24 RCNY 161.05). However, the Court of Appeals has decided that local leash laws have no bearing on whether liability in negligence ought to attach … , undermining the declared public policy of those localities that have enacted such laws … And although the [Court of Appeals] reasoned that New Yorkers may expect to find unrestrained dogs in public parks … , New Yorkers certainly do not expect to find those dogs running on public roads towing large metal objects behind them. A dog owner who, without observing a reasonable standard of care, attaches his or her dog to an object that could foreseeably become weaponized if the dog is able to drag the object through public areas should not be immune from liability when that conduct causes injury. Scavetta v Wechsler, 2017 NY Slip Op 01985, 1st Dept 3-16-17

ANIMAL LAW (ALTHOUGH THE FIRST DEPARTMENT FELT CONSTRAINED BY COURT OF APPEALS PRECEDENT TO DISMISS THIS DOG INJURY CASE SOUNDING IN NEGLIGENCE, THE COURT FORCEFULLY ARGUED THE LAW SHOULD BE CHANGED TO ALLOW SUCH A SUIT)/DOGS (ALTHOUGH THE FIRST DEPARTMENT FELT CONSTRAINED BY COURT OF APPEALS PRECEDENT TO DISMISS THIS DOG INJURY CASE SOUNDING IN NEGLIGENCE, THE COURT FORCEFULLY ARGUED THE LAW SHOULD BE CHANGED TO ALLOW SUCH A SUIT)/NEGLIGENCE (DOGS, ALTHOUGH THE FIRST DEPARTMENT FELT CONSTRAINED BY COURT OF APPEALS PRECEDENT TO DISMISS THIS DOG INJURY CASE SOUNDING IN NEGLIGENCE, THE COURT FORCEFULLY ARGUED THE LAW SHOULD BE CHANGED TO ALLOW SUCH A SUIT)

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