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A TRIAL JUDGE DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS, ONLY THE APPELLATE DIVISION HAS THAT POWER.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined a trial judge who renders a guilty verdict on an indictment count in a bench trial cannot thereafter conduct a weight of the evidence analysis and dismiss the count. Here, the judge reserved decision on defendant’s motion for a trial order of dismissal, found the defendant guilty, and then dismissed the count pursuant to the motion for a trial order of dismissal based up a weight of the evidence analysis:

 

“A Trial Judge who has rendered a guilty verdict after a nonjury trial has neither inherent power nor statutory authority to reconsider his [or her] factual determination. Although he [or she] may correct clerical or ministerial errors, he [or she] is without authority to reassess the facts and change a guilty verdict to not guilty” … . “After formal rendition of a verdict at a bench trial, a trial court lacks authority to reweigh the factual evidence and reconsider the verdict” … . “The term verdict’ is defined as the announcement . . . by the court in the case of a non-jury trial, of its decision upon the defendant’s guilt or innocence of the charges . . . considered by it'” … . Thus, “[t]rial judges are prohibited from setting aside a verdict as against the weight of the evidence. This power is reserved to the Appellate Division, which essentially sits as a thirteenth juror” … . * * *

Here, the defendant moved pursuant to CPL 290.10, at the close of evidence, for a trial order of dismissal, and the court reserved decision, as permitted by CPL 290.10 (1)(b), until after the verdict was rendered. We conclude that, where a defendant has moved for a trial order of dismissal pursuant to CPL 290.10 and the court has held all or part of that motion in abeyance, a court conducting a nonjury trial likewise may not render a verdict and then reconsider its factual determination; instead, the court must consider the legal sufficiency of the evidence in support of its original verdict … . Accordingly, in this matter, the Supreme Court’s order vacating its verdict of guilty as to count two of the indictment and dismissing that count must be reversed.  People v Dobson, 2016 NY Slip Op 01198, 2nd Dept 2-17-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (TRIAL JUDGE, IN A BENCH TRIAL, DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS AFTER ISSUING A GUILTY VERDICT)/WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (TRIAL JUDGE, IN A BENCH TRIAL, DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS AFTER ISSUING A GUILTY VERDICT)/TRIAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL (TRIAL JUDGE, IN A BENCH TRIAL, DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS AFTER ISSUING A GUILTY VERDICT)/BENCH TRIAL (TRIAL JUDGE, IN A BENCH TRIAL, DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS AFTER ISSUING A GUILTY VERDICT)

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