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PLAINTIFF MORTGAGE SERVICER DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE TO DEMONSTRATE STANDING AND DID NOT SUBMIT PROOF IT HAD BEEN DELEGATED THE AUTHORITY TO FORECLOSE, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff, a mortgage loan servicer for Wilmington (bank), did not demonstrate standing to foreclose and did not demonstrate it had been delegated the authority to foreclose by Wilmington. Therefore, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was properly denied:

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… [I]n support of its motion, the plaintiff relied on the affidavit of Jessica Lancaster, its “Legal Coordinator.” Lancaster averred that the subject “loan” was part of a portfolio of assets purchased by Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., and deposited into Wilmington. Lancaster further averred that on February 1, 2013, “the notes and mortgages relating to the Purchased Assets were physically delivered to the offices of [the plaintiff].” The affidavit, which was based upon Lancaster’s review of and familiarity with the plaintiff’s records, was sufficient to establish, prima facie, that “the notes and mortgages relating to the Purchased Assets” were physically delivered to the plaintiff. However, Lancaster’s averment that the subject “loan” was among those purchased assets was hearsay for which she failed to lay a proper foundation under the business records exception to the hearsay rule (see CPLR 4518[a]…). Moreover, no further evidence was submitted to establish that the subject note and mortgage were among the purchased assets. Accordingly, the plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, its standing to commence this action.

In addition, the plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, its capacity to commence this action. In that respect, the plaintiff did not demonstrate, prima facie, that it had been delegated the authority by Wilmington to act on its behalf with respect to the subject mortgage since it failed to submit any agreement, power of attorney, or similar documentation of such alleged authority … . 21st Mtge. Corp. v Adames, 2017 NY Slip Op 05925, Second Dept 8-2-17

 

FORECLOSURE (PLAINTIFF MORTGAGE SERVICER DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE TO DEMONSTRATE STANDING AND DID NOT SUBMIT PROOF IT HAD BEEN DELEGATED THE AUTHORITY TO FORECLOSE, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (FORECLOSURE, STANDING, BUSINESS RECORDS, PLAINTIFF MORTGAGE SERVICER DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE TO DEMONSTRATE STANDING AND DID NOT SUBMIT PROOF IT HAD BEEN DELEGATED THE AUTHORITY TO FORECLOSE, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/BUSINESS RECORDS (FORECLOSURE, STANDING, PLAINTIFF MORTGAGE SERVICER DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE TO DEMONSTRATE STANDING AND DID NOT SUBMIT PROOF IT HAD BEEN DELEGATED THE AUTHORITY TO FORECLOSE, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/HEARSAY (FORECLOSURE, BUSINESS RECORDS, STANDING, PLAINTIFF MORTGAGE SERVICER DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE TO DEMONSTRATE STANDING AND DID NOT SUBMIT PROOF IT HAD BEEN DELEGATED THE AUTHORITY TO FORECLOSE, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))

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