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DEFENDANT CHARGED WITH INSURANCE FRAUD INVOLVING AIG, FOR CAUSE CHALLENGE TO JUROR WHO WORKED FOR AIG SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED 2ND DEPT.

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s convictions, determined the “for cause” challenge to a juror should have been granted. Defendant was charged with offenses related to insurance fraud. The insurer was AIG. The prospective juror worked for AIG:

Here, during the first round of jury selection, prospective juror No. 16 indicated that she worked for AIG. Upon inquiry by the defendant, the prospective juror explained that her job involved analyzing the financial policies for three divisions at AIG: “[a]sset management, financial services, and domestic life.” We note that, in response to the defendant’s questions, the prospective juror did not provide a completely unequivocal assurance that she could be fair and impartial. She thought that she could be fair and impartial, but conceded that there “may be” a conflict of interest from the defendant’s perspective, and that it might be better if she were on a different case so as to enable the defendant to feel “comfortable” that he “wouldn’t be prejudiced in any way.” Thereafter, the County Court denied the defendant’s for-cause challenge without asking the prospective juror any questions about her employment at AIG or how it might affect her ability to serve as a juror, notwithstanding that the court had an obligation to try and determine “[a]ll issues of fact or law arising on the challenge” (CPL 270.20[2]).

Contrary to the County Court’s determination, the prospective juror’s professional relationship with AIG, her employer, rendered her unsuitable for jury service and necessitated her removal for cause (see CPL 270.20[1][c]… ). We note that AIG drafted and funded the insurance check underlying several counts of the indictment, and AIG was the named complainant in the count alleging insurance fraud in the third degree. Under all the circumstances, there was a considerable risk that the prospective juror could unwittingly give undue credence to witnesses from AIG and her service would give rise to the perception that the defendant did not receive a fair trial … . People v Guldi, 2017 NY Slip Op 05459, 2nd Dept 7-5-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (JURORS, FOR CAUSE CHALLENGE, DEFENDANT CHARGED WITH INSURANCE FRAUD INVOLVING AIG, FOR CAUSE CHALLENGE TO JUROR WHO WORKED FOR AIG SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED 2ND DEPT)/JURORS (CRIMINAL LAW, FOR CAUSE CHALLENGE,  DEFENDANT CHARGED WITH INSURANCE FRAUD INVOLVING AIG, FOR CAUSE CHALLENGE TO JUROR WHO WORKED FOR AIG SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED 2ND DEPT)/FOR CAUSE CHALLENGE (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT CHARGED WITH INSURANCE FRAUD INVOLVING AIG, FOR CAUSE CHALLENGE TO JUROR WHO WORKED FOR AIG SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED 2ND DEPT)

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