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IT WAS (HARMLESS) ERROR TO ADMIT TESTIMONY OF THE PEOPLE’S DNA EXPERT, THE TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the testimony of the People’s DNA expert violated defendant’s right to confrontation. The error was deemed harmless however:

… [T]he Supreme Court should not have admitted, over the defendant’s objection, the testimony of the People’s DNA expert, as such testimony violated the defendant’s right to confrontation… . In order to satisfy the Confrontation Clause where the People seek to introduce testimonial DNA evidence, “an analyst who witnessed, performed or supervised the generation of defendant’s DNA profile, or who used his or her independent analysis on the raw data, as opposed to a testifying analyst functioning as a conduit for the conclusions of others, must be available to testify”… . Although the People’s expert testified that he conducted a “technical review” of the reports prepared by another criminalist whom he supervises, he did not establish that such review entailed using his own independent analysis on the raw data … .

Even so, the error in admitting the testimonial DNA evidence was harmless since the proof of the defendant’s guilt, without reference to the erroneously admitted DNA evidence, was overwhelming and there was no reasonable possibility that the Supreme Court would have acquitted the defendant had it not been for the error … . People v Dyson, 2019 NY Slip Op 01225, Second Dept 2-20-19

CRAWFORD, CROSS-EXAMINATION

 

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