You are here: / / QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER EMPLOYEE WAS ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT...
,

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER EMPLOYEE WAS ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT WHEN THE CAR ACCIDENT OCCURRED.

The Second Department determined there was a question of fact whether the driver of a car involved in an accident was acting within the scope of his employment at the time. Therefore Supreme Court erred when it dismissed the complaint against the employer, alleging liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Here the employee was driving to the employer’s house, which had been used as the employer’s office, when the accident occurred:

 

The doctrine of respondeat superior renders an employer vicariously liable for torts committed by an employee acting in furtherance of the employer’s business and within the scope of his or her employment … . “An employee’s actions fall within the scope of employment where the purpose in performing such actions is to further the employer’s interest, or to carry out duties incumbent upon the employee in furthering the employer’s business” … . “Conversely, where an employee’s actions are taken for wholly personal reasons, which are not job related, his or her conduct cannot be said to fall within the scope of employment” … .

“An act is considered to be within the scope of employment if it is performed while the employee is engaged generally in the business of his employer, or if his act may be reasonably said to be necessary or incidental to such employment” … . “[T]he employer may be liable when the employee acts negligently or intentionally, so long as the tortious conduct is generally foreseeable and a natural incident of the employment” … . “[B]ecause the determination of whether a particular act was within the scope of the servant’s employment is so heavily dependent on factual considerations, the question is ordinarily one for the jury” … . Brandford v Singh, 2016 NY Slip Op 00920, 2nd Dept 2-10-16

 

NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, INFORMED CONSENT, DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO AFFIRMATIVELY DEMONSTRATE SCARRING DISCUSSED PRIOR TO SIGNING OF CONSENT FORM AND FAILURE TO DEMONSTRATE PLAINTIFF WOULD HAVE GONE THROUGH WITH THE SURGERY DESPITE FULL DISCLOSURE REQUIRED DENIAL OF DEFENSE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (INFORMED CONSENT, DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO AFFIRMATIVELY DEMONSTRATE SCARRING DISCUSSED PRIOR TO SIGNING OF CONSENT FORM AND FAILURE TO DEMONSTRATE PLAINTIFF WOULD HAVE GONE THROUGH WITH THE SURGERY DESPITE FULL DISCLOSURE REQUIRED DENIAL OF DEFENSE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION)
You might also like
THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN TOLD NOT TO CONSIDER THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE IF THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE WAS PROVEN FOR THE HIGHER OFFENSE, THE JURY ALSO SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED ON THE ‘TEMPORARY INNOCENT POSSESSION OF A WEAPON’ DEFENSE, JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).
HIGHWAY LAW ALLOWING AN UNUSED PUBLIC EASEMENT TO BE DECLARED ABANDONED DOES NOT APPLY WHERE THE MUNICIPALITY OWNS A FEE INTEREST IN THE ROADBED.
INSURER’S ACTION FOR A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT THAT IT WAS NOT OBLIGATED TO INDEMNIFY THE DEFENDANT SCHOOL DISTRICT FOR A SETTLEMENT REACHED IN AN UNDERLYING ACTION (WHICH ALLEGED THE SCHOOL DISTRICT DID NOT PROTECT AGAINST ANTI-SEMITIC HARASSMENT) SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
THE MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT INDEMNIFICATION CORPORATION (MVAIC) CANNOT DEMAND A RELEASE FROM THE PLAINTIFF ONCE THE MVAIC’S OBLIGATION TO PAY HAS BEEN REDUCED TO A JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).
PROOF OF THE VALUE OF THE STOLEN ITEMS WAS INSUFFICIENT; GRAND LARCENY 3RD DEGREE CONVICTION NOT SUPPORTED BY THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT).
Jury Instructions Which Lumped Counts Together and Did Not Give the Jury the Information Necessary to Distinguish One Count from Another Mandated a New Trial
THE REFEREE’S REPORT WAS BASED UPON INFORMATION IN BUSINESS RECORDS WHICH WERE NOT ATTACHED TO THE AFFIDAVIT IN WHICH THE RECORDS WERE DESCRIBED; THE INFORMATION IN THE AFFIDAVIT WAS THEREFORE INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY (SECOND DEPT).
“Special Errand” Exception to the “Going and Coming” Rule Applied—Workers’ Compensation Claim Is Plaintiff’s Sole Remedy

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

SECOND SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION PROPERLY ENTERTAINED; ABSENCE OF SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP... FAILURE TO DEMONSTRATE SCARRING WAS DISCUSSED PRIOR TO THE SIGNING OF THE CONSENT...