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THE MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT INDEMNIFICATION CORPORATION (MVAIC) CANNOT DEMAND A RELEASE FROM THE PLAINTIFF ONCE THE MVAIC’S OBLIGATION TO PAY HAS BEEN REDUCED TO A JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department modified the judgment in this uninsured driver traffic accident case. Although the Motor Vehicle Accident indemnification Corporation (MVAIC) can withhold payment until it receives a release from the plaintiff pursuant to a settlement agreement, the MVAIC cannot demand a release where, as here, a court has issued a judgment:

“Where judgment has been entered against an uninsured defendant in favor of a qualified person, Insurance Law § 5210 provides that a qualified person may petition the court to compel MVAIC to pay the amount of a judgment against that uninsured defendant that remains unpaid, subject to the limitations contained therein” … . Here, the petitioner demonstrated that she obtained the underlying judgment … , which remained unpaid. However, the sum sought by the petitioner, and the amount the Supreme Court directed MVAIC to pay, exceeded MVAIC’s statutory limit of liability.

The maximum limit of MVAIC’s liability under the Insurance Law is $25,000 (see Insurance Law § 5210[a][1]). MVAIC’s contention that the petitioner is not entitled to interest because the delay in payment was caused by the plaintiff’s failure to execute a release in the proper amount is without merit. While MVAIC has the right to a release upon the settlement of a claim (see Insurance Law § 5213[b]; CPLR 5003-a), MVAIC is not entitled to such a release when ordered to pay on a judgment. Matter of Baker v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp., 2018 NY Slip Op 03676, Second Dept 5-23-18

​INSURANCE LAW (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, UNINSURED MOTORIST, THE MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT INDEMNIFICATION CORPORATION (MVAIC) CANNOT DEMAND A RELEASE FROM THE PLAINTIFF ONCE THE MVAIC’S OBLIGATION TO PAY HAS BEEN REDUCED TO A JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (INSURANCE LAW, UNINSURED MOTORIST, THE MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT INDEMNIFICATION CORPORATION (MVAIC) CANNOT DEMAND A RELEASE FROM THE PLAINTIFF ONCE THE MVAIC’S OBLIGATION TO PAY HAS BEEN REDUCED TO A JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT INDEMNIFICATION CORPORATION (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, UNINSURED MOTORIST, THE MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT INDEMNIFICATION CORPORATION (MVAIC) CANNOT DEMAND A RELEASE FROM THE PLAINTIFF ONCE THE MVAIC’S OBLIGATION TO PAY HAS BEEN REDUCED TO A JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/UNINSURED DRIVERS  (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, UNINSURED MOTORIST, THE MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT INDEMNIFICATION CORPORATION (MVAIC) CANNOT DEMAND A RELEASE FROM THE PLAINTIFF ONCE THE MVAIC’S OBLIGATION TO PAY HAS BEEN REDUCED TO A JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT INDEMNIFICATION CORPORATION, UNINSURED MOTORIST, THE MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT INDEMNIFICATION CORPORATION (MVAIC) CANNOT DEMAND A RELEASE FROM THE PLAINTIFF ONCE THE MVAIC’S OBLIGATION TO PAY HAS BEEN REDUCED TO A JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/RELEASES (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, UNINSURED MOTORIST, THE MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT INDEMNIFICATION CORPORATION (MVAIC) CANNOT DEMAND A RELEASE FROM THE PLAINTIFF ONCE THE MVAIC’S OBLIGATION TO PAY HAS BEEN REDUCED TO A JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))

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