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“Special Errand” Exception to the “Going and Coming” Rule Applied—Workers’ Compensation Claim Is Plaintiff’s Sole Remedy

The Second Department determined plaintiff’s sole remedy against her employer (defendant Margaret Layton) was a Workers’ Compensation claim.  Plaintiff was asked by Layton to walk Layton’s dog because Layton was in court on a personal matter and could not walk the dog herself. Plaintiff fell down a staircase in Layton’s home, apparently in the course of walking the dog. The Second Department held that the walking of the dog “fell within the ‘special errand’ exception to the ‘going and coming’ rule of the Workers’ Compensation Law, thus making workers’ compensation the plaintiffs’ sole remedy” … In the usual case, injury incurred going to or coming from work is not within the ambit of the Workers’ Compensation Law . Curley v Layton, 2015 NY Slip Op 04270, 2nd Dept 5-20-15

 

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