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“Voluntary Payment Doctrine” Explained and Applied to Preclude Recovery

The Second Department determined the “voluntary payment doctrine” precluded recovery against the defendant. Plaintiff had an agreement with a consignee that plaintiff’s liability associated with the export of fine art would be limited to $40,000. Plaintiff hired defendant to transport the fine art to the consignee, but the art was seized by customs because the documentation was incomplete. The plaintiff, despite the $40,000 liability cap, voluntarily compensated the consignee for its loss (around $240,000). Then plaintiff sued defendant for the $240,000. Because the plaintiff made that payment voluntarily, the “voluntary payment doctrine” required dismissal of the complaint:

“[T]he voluntary payment doctrine . . . bars recovery of payments voluntarily made with full knowledge of the facts, and in the absence of fraud or mistake of material fact or law” … . Here, the defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law through the submission of, among other things, a copy of the contract between the plaintiff and the consignee, which included the limitation of liability provision that capped the plaintiff’s liability to the consignee at $40,000. This demonstrated, prima facie, that the plaintiff’s payment to the consignee of anything more than $40,000 was voluntary … . Further, the defendant demonstrated, prima face, that the plaintiff recovered the full $40,000 for which it was liable to the consignee from its insurance company. Hedley’s, Inc. v Airwaves Global Logistics, LLC, 2015 NY Slip Op 06215, 2nd Dept 7-22-15

 

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