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DELIBERATE ACTS BY DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY RESULTED IN THE DEFAULT, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s attorney’s deliberate acts required denial of defendant’s motion to vacate the default:

The affirmations of the defendant’s attorney reveal that he made a conscious decision not to submit any papers in opposition to the plaintiff’s motion even though the Supreme Court gave him ample opportunity to do so. In addition, defense counsel waited until the plaintiff served a proposed default order, more than four months after the court declared the defendant to be in default, before serving the defendant’s motion to vacate. Under these circumstances, the defendant’s failure to oppose the plaintiff’s motion was willful … .

The defendant claims that her default was caused by law office failure based on defense counsel’s statement in his affirmation that his “office will take full responsibility.” At most, defense counsel’s advice, and the defendant’s decision to follow it, constituted a misguided strategy, not law office failure … . Thus, the defendant failed to establish a reasonable excuse for her default … . Bove v Bove, 2019 NY Slip Op 01555, Second Dept 3-6-19

 

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