Defendant Denied Constitutional Right to Present a Defense—Evidence Victim Identified Another as the Perpetrator Wrongly Excluded
In a full-fledged opinion by Justice Miller reversing defendant’s conviction, the Second Department determined defendant had been deprived of his constitutional right to present a defense. The primary problem identified by the Second Department (among many others not mentioned here but worth reading about) was the preclusion of evidence that the victim had repeatedly identified someone other than the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. Two crucial pieces of such evidence, an entry in the victim’s diary and a statement made to a third party by the victim, were hearsay. The court found that the People’s hearsay objection was waived because it wasn’t raised before the appeal. Concerning the failure to allow evidence of the victim’s identification of another as the perpetrator, the Second Department wrote:
“Before permitting evidence that another individual committed the crime for which a defendant is on trial, the court is required to determine if the evidence is relevant and probative of a fact at issue in the case, and further that it is not based upon suspicion or surmise” … . “Then, the court must balance the probative value of the evidence against the prejudicial effect to the People and may, in an exercise of its discretion, exclude relevant evidence that will cause undue prejudice, delay the trial, or confuse or mislead the jury” … . Although a trial court has “broad discretion to keep the proceedings within manageable limits and to curtail exploration of collateral matters” …, “the trial court’s discretion in this area is circumscribed by the defendant’s constitutional rights to present a defense and confront his accusers” … .
Here, the evidence that the victim identified Uppal as the perpetrator was exculpatory evidence that was directly relevant to the fundamental issue in this case—the identity of the attacker. Furthermore, such evidence of third-party culpability, coming from the victim of the crime herself, cannot be properly characterized as “rest[ing] on mere suspicion or surmise”… People v Thompson, 2013 NY Slip Op 05707, 2nd Dept 8-21-13