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The Unjustified Denial of Defense Counsel’s Request to Withdraw a Peremptory Challenge Was, Under the Facts, Subject to a Harmless Error Analysis

The Second Department determined the trial court erred when it denied defense counsel’s request to withdraw a peremptory challenge to a juror. However, the error was deemed harmless because of the nature of the evidence against the defendant. On appeal the Second Department primarily addressed whether the harmless error analysis applied to the withdrawal of a peremptory challenge:

The defendant contends that the Supreme Court’s improper denial of his request to withdraw his peremptory challenge is not subject to harmless error analysis, since the error deprived him of his constitutional right to a jury in whose selection he had a voice … . We disagree. While peremptory challenges “are a mainstay in a litigant’s strategic arsenal,” they are “not a trial tool of constitutional magnitude” … . The right to exercise peremptory challenges “is protected by the Criminal Procedure Law, which provides that each party must be allowed’ an equal number of peremptory challenges and that a court must exclude’ any juror challenged” … . Therefore, “the unjustified denial of a peremptory challenge violates CPL 270.25(2) and requires reversal without regard to harmless error” … . However, there is no statutory right to withdraw a peremptory challenge. Further, the instant case does not involve a situation in which the People attempted to peremptorily challenge a juror who had been accepted by the defense in violation of CPL 270.15(2), inasmuch as the People did not object to the defendant’s request to withdraw the peremptory challenge … . Moreover, the defendant was not prejudiced by the loss of the peremptory challenge since, at the conclusion of jury selection, defense counsel had exercised only 9 of his 15 peremptory challenges … . Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, the error was harmless. People v Marshall, 2015 NY Slip Op 06830, 2nd Dept 9-16-15

 

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