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Parking Lots Owned by a Federal-Income-Tax-Exempt Charitable Organization Formed to Facilitate Commercial Development Were Not Entitled to a Charitable Exemption from Real Property Taxes—The Parking Lots Were “Used” to Increase Commerce Which Is Not a Charitable Use Under the Real Property Tax Law

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott, over a two-judge dissent, determined that parking lots owned by “Greater Jamaica” were not entitled to a charitable exemption from real estate taxes.  “Greater Jamaica” is an organization formed for the purpose of facilitating Jamaica’s commercial development.  It is exempt from federal income taxation pursuant to 26 USC 501 (c) (3).  The NYC Department of Finance (DOF) revoked Greater Jamaica’s exemption from real estate taxes which the DOF had previously granted. Supreme Court upheld the revocation. The Appellate Division reversed Supreme Court. And the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division. The Court of Appeals noted that the criteria for a charitable exemption under the IRS code is different from the criteria under Real Property Tax Law (RPTL) 420-a and, although a court may consider the IRS exemption in a RPTL 420-a proceeding, the IRS exemption is not determinative. The Court of Appeals concluded the parking lots were primarily used to facilitate the commercial growth of Jamaica, which was not a charitable purpose under the RPTL:

The City revoked the tax exemption on the ground that it was erroneously awarded in the first instance. It met its burden in this regard by demonstrating that the “use” of the parking facilities was not for “charitable” purposes but rather for economic development, and that the use of the parking facilities were not “incidental to another recognized charitable [*6]purpose.” Specifically, the City’s revocation letter explained that the City reached its determination after reviewing documents submitted to it by Greater Jamaica and case law from this Court. The City also explained why it believed that the status granted Greater Jamaica by the IRS had no bearing on the issue of “charitable use” of the parking facilities under section 420-a. The letter stated that although the parking facilities may have served “an important public purpose and support[ed] development of a community,” those factors did not qualify the facilities for a charitable exemption. Indeed, according to the City’s review of the ownership structure of the lots along with other documentation, it appeared that Jamaica First collected monies that exceeded the carrying, maintenance and depreciation charges attributable to the premises and that Jamaica First utilized those excess proceeds to fund other additional operations, such as the purchase of an additional parking lot. * * *

Although we do not disturb the Appellate Division’s holding that petitioners met the “organized or conducted exclusively for . . . charitable . . . purposes” prong of the tax exemption test, we part company with the Appellate Division relative to its holding that “petitioners demonstrated that the use of their public parking facilities was consistent with their exempt purpose, as expressly noted by the IRS in granting such operation tax exempt status” … . By so holding, the Appellate Division utilized the petitioners’ organizational status’ under Internal Revenue Code (26 USC) § 501 (c) (3) to support its holding that petitioners’ demonstrated that the use of the parking facilities was for an exempt purpose. This was error. …

… [T]he IRS’s definition of what constitutes an exempt “charitable” purpose is exceedingly broad, including, among other things, “the lessening of the burdens of [g]overnment” (26 CFR 1.501 [c] [3]-1 [d] [2]), while the second prong of section 420-a (1) (a) requires a court to review “the actual or physical use of the property when it exempts from taxation property ‘used exclusively for carrying out thereupon one or more’ exempt purposes” … . Thus, our analysis under section 420-a is concerned with the “use” of the parking facilities as a whole, and whether the facilities are “used exclusively for carrying out thereupon one or more of [section 420-a’s] purposes.” * * *

We disagree with petitioners’ assertion that the parking facilities are charitable in and of themselves because they fulfill the primary purpose of economic development. The economic benefit conveyed by below-market rate parking, however, inures to the benefit of private enterprise and cannot be said to further any charitable purpose. It lessens the burden of local businesses, obviating any need for them to make their own parking arrangements for prospective customers. The below-market rates that the facilities charge provide an incentive for the public to patronize those businesses, providing a dual benefit for local business and a benefit to prospective customers of those businesses. While these goals may be laudable, they are not charitable. Matter of Greater Jamaica Dev. Corp. v New York City Tax Commn., 2015 NY Slip Op 05620, CtApp 7-1-15

 

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