You are here: / / A SENTENCING COURT MAY REQUIRE A DEFENDANT, AS A CONDITION OF PROBATION,...
,

A SENTENCING COURT MAY REQUIRE A DEFENDANT, AS A CONDITION OF PROBATION, TO PAY FOR ELECTRONIC MONITORING, IF A DEFENDANT CLAIMS AN INABILITY TO PAY, A HEARING MUST BE HELD TO DETERMINE WHETHER ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE TO INCARCERATION IS APPROPRIATE AND, IF NOT, THE DEFENDANT MAY BE SENTENCED TO PRISON (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Feinman, over a dissenting opinion, determined that the sentencing court, as a condition of probation, may require a defendant to pay for a Secure Continuous Remote Alcohol Monitoring (SCRAM) bracelet. Defendant, who had pled guilty to felony driving while intoxicated, made several monthly payments for the bracelet but then stopped paying and the monitoring company removed the bracelet. County Court then sentenced defendant to prison. The 3rd Department held that the sentence was illegal because the court cannot require a defendant to pay the cost of electronic monitoring:

Were we to hold that any monetary component of a condition that must be borne by a defendant per se invalidated said condition, sentencing courts would be divested of their broad authority to impose a myriad of probationary requirements, and consequently, would, in many instances, no longer view release into the community as a viable alternative to incarceration. In light of this, the requirement that defendant wear and pay for a SCRAM bracelet was well within County Court’s statutory authority under Penal Law § 65.10 (4).

This is not to say that requiring a defendant to wear and pay for an electronic monitoring device will always be reasonable. Courts cannot impose a condition of probation that includes costs a particular defendant cannot feasibly meet. Nor can courts incarcerate a defendant who has initially agreed to meet a condition requiring a payment, but who subsequently becomes unable to do so. * * *

… [I]f, at the imposition of the sentence or during the course of probation, a defendant asserts that they are unable to meet the financial obligations attendant to a certain condition, the sentencing court must hold a hearing on the matter … . The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard in person, present witnesses, and offer documentary evidence establishing that they made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay … . If, after such inquiry, the sentencing court determines that the defendant has adequately demonstrated an inability to pay the costs associated with a particular condition despite bona fide efforts to do so, the court must attempt to fashion a reasonable alternative to incarceration … . Conversely, if the sentencing court determines, by a preponderance of the evidence … , that “a probationer has willfully refused to pay . . . when [that defendant] can pay, the [court] is justified in revoking probation and using imprisonment as an appropriate penalty for the offense” … . People v Hakes, 2018 NY Slip Op 08538, CtApp 12-13-18

 

You might also like
A GENERIC NEW YORK CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION IN A CONTRACT DOES NOT TRANSFORM ALL NEW YORK STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS INTO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS, HERE THE CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT CONTRACT DID NOT MENTION BOND REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE LIEN LAW AND THE CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION COULD NOT BE USED TO READ THE LIEN LAW REQUIREMENT INTO THE CONTRACT (CT APP).
Retroactive Tax Credit Restrictions Violated Due Process
In Cases Not Involving Death or Bodily Injury Arising from an Accident, Whether a Notice of Disclaimer is Timely Is Governed by Common Law Waiver and Estoppel Principles, Not by the Provisions of Insurance law 3420
THE SORA RISK-LEVEL GUIDELINES CONSIDER A SEX OFFENDER’S YOUTH (UNDER 20) AS AN AGGRAVATING FACTOR WARRANTING AN ASSESSMENT OF TEN POINTS; HERE DEFENDANTS ARGUED THEIR YOUTH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A MITIGATING FACTOR; THAT ISSUE CAN ONLY BE ADDRESSED BY THE LEGISLATURE, NOT THE COURTS (CT APP).
THE FIRST DEPARTMENT RULED THAT PLAINTIFF-TENANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT DEFENDANTS ENGAGED IN A FRAUDULENT SCHEME TO DEREGULATE APARTMENTS WHILE RECEIVING J51 TAX BENEFITS; THE COURT OF APPEALS REVERSED (CT APP).
THE WAIVER OF APPEAL WAS INVALID; THE PLEA COURT CONFLATED THE RIGHT TO APPEAL WITH THE RIGHTS FORFEITED BY A GUILTY PLEA; CASE REMITTED TO THE APPELLATE DIVISION FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE SUPPRESSION CLAIM (CT APP).
DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT “I WOULD LOVE TO GO PRO SE” WAS NOT A DEFINITIVE REQUEST TO REPRESENT HIMSELF AND THEREFORE THE STATEMENT DID NOT TRIGGER THE NEED FOR A SEARCHING INQUIRY BY THE JUDGE (CT APP).
THE TRIAL JUDGE’S FAILURE TO ACT ON DEFENSE COUNSEL’S OBJECTION TO T-SHIRTS REMEMBERING THE MURDER VICTIM WAS ERROR; UNDER THE FACTS, THE ERROR WAS HARMLESS.

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

CLAIMANT, WHO HAD BEEN INJURED, DID NOT DEMONSTRATE SHE WAS ABLE TO WORK DURING... QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE EMPLOYER OF THE DRIVER WHO KILLED A BICYCLIST...