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RELEASE SIGNED BY PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT IN 1997 DID NOT ENTITLE CHEVRON TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS ASBESTOS-MESOTHELIOMA CASE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, over a three-judge dissent, determined that defendant Chevron was not entitled to summary judgment in this asbestos-mesothelioma action. Plaintiff’s decedent [Mr. South] signed a release in 1997 and Chevron argued the release precluded the subsequent lawsuit:

Like Supreme Court, the Appellate Division concluded that the record did not demonstrate Chevron’s entitlement to summary judgment, because the release did not specifically mention mesothelioma, which then required the court to determine whether extrinsic evidence entitled Chevron to summary judgment. Pointing to the “meager consideration” [$1,750] and the lack of any diagnosis of mesothelioma as to Mr. South at the time he settled, the Appellate Division concluded that the record left open the question of whether the release pertained to an existing pulmonary condition and the fear of some future asbestos-related disease, or if it was intended to release all future asbestos-related diseases arising from Mr. South’s employment by Texaco. The parties agree that, at the time he executed the release, Mr. South suffered from a nonmalignant pulmonary disease but not from mesothelioma or cancer. …

The sole question presented to us on this appeal is whether Chevron has established that the release, coupled with the 1997 complaint, eliminates all material questions of fact and proves that the release bars the claims here as a matter of law. Answering that question requires us to consider the protections afforded to Mr. South by admiralty law and Section 5 of FELA [Federal Employers’ Liability Act] (45 USC § 55), which is incorporated into the Jones Act by 46 USC § 30104. …

… [W]e conclude that Chevron has not met its burden to demonstrate the absence of any material question of fact. The 1997 release does not unambiguously extinguish a future claim for mesothelioma  … . The release itself does not mention mesothelioma. It does say that Mr. South “is giving up the right to bring an action against the Released Parties, or any of them, in the future for any new or different diagnosis that may be made about Claimant’s condition as a result of exposure to any product[.]” But “claimant’s condition” may cabin the “new or different diagnosis” to ones that related to his nonmalignant asbestos-related pulmonary disease—the “condition” both parties agree was the only one he suffered at the time. Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig., 2019 NY Slip Op 01259, CtApp 2-19-19

 

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