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THE TRIAL JUDGE’S NEGOTIATION OF A PLEA DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE CO-DEFENDANT, IN RETURN FOR THE CO-DEFENDANT’S ESSENTIAL TESTIMONY IDENTIFYING THE DEFENDANT AS ONE OF THE ROBBERS DEPICTED IN A VIDEO, DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, over a concurrence, reversing the Appellate Division, determined  the trial judge had deprived defendant of a fair trial by negotiating a plea agreement directly with the co-defendant in return for the co-defendant’s testimony against the defendant. Although the defendant and co-defendant in this robbery case were captured on video, their faces were covered. At trial the co-defendant identified the defendant as the person depicted in the video:

It is undisputed that, as the Appellate Division concluded, the trial court “personally negotiate[ed] and enter[ed] into a quid pro quo cooperation agreement with the codefendant whereby the court promised to sentence the codefendant within a specific range in exchange for his testimony against defendant” (151 AD3d at 1639). In so doing, the trial court improperly “assume[d] the advocacy role traditionally reserved for counsel” … and ventured from its own role as a neutral arbiter “[s]tationed above the clamor of counsel or the partisan pursuit of procedural or substantive advantage” … . Indeed, whatever its subjective intentions, the trial court effectively procured a witness in support of the prosecution by inducing the codefendant to testify concerning statements the codefendant made to police—which identified defendant as one of the robbers—in exchange for the promise of a more lenient sentence. Significantly, by tying its assessment of the truthfulness of the codefendant’s testimony to that individual’s prior statements to police, the trial court essentially directed the codefendant on how the codefendant must testify in order to receive the benefit of the bargain … . Under these circumstances, the trial court’s conduct “conflicted impermissibly with the notion of fundamental fairness” … . That is, by assuming the function of an interested party and deviating from its own role as a neutral arbiter, the trial court denied defendant his due process right to “[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal” (In re Murchison, 349 US at 136). This error is not subject to harmless error review and requires reversal … . People v Towns, 2019 NY Slip Op 03527, CtApp 5-7-19

 

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