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Sworn Juror Who Was From the Same Neighborhood as Defendant Stated His Fear of Drug Dealers Would Prevent Him from Reaching an Impartial Verdict—the Juror Was Properly Discharged as “Grossly Unqualified” and “For Cause” Based Upon a Newly Discovered Ground

The First Department determined a sworn juror was properly discharged as “grossly unqualified,” as well as “for cause.” The juror lived in the neighborhood where the crime occurred and where defendant and his accomplices lived. The juror told the court that his fear of drug dealers in his neighborhood would prevent him from reaching an impartial verdict. The juror had not mentioned his fear before he was sworn:

The juror’s fear provided grounds for the court to dismiss him as “grossly unqualified to serve” pursuant to CPL 270.35(1), even if the court did not cite the statutory phrasing, because it was clear that the juror could not remain impartial. Additionally, since the juror had not mentioned that he feared for his safety when questioned by the court and the parties before being sworn, he was properly discharged for cause, on a newly discovered ground, pursuant to CPL 270.15(4). People v Ward, 2015 NY Slip Op 04928, 1st Dept 6-11-15

 

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