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Plaintiff Not Competent When Release Was Signed/Statute of Limitations Tolled by Plaintiff’s Mental Disability

The Third Department determined Supreme Court properly concluded the release signed by the plaintiff was not enforceable, because the plaintiff was not competent at the time it was signed, and the statute of limitations was tolled by plaintiff’s mental disability. Plaintiff suffered a brain injury when he was struck by a car in 1991. A few months later plaintiff signed a release provided by an insurance adjuster in return for $5000.  The case languished for years and Supreme Court denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the case in 2014. The court explained the relevant law:

With respect to the release signed by plaintiff, “the burden of proving incompetence rests upon the party asserting incapacity to enter into an agreement [and], to prevail, plaintiff was required to establish that [his] ‘mind was so affected as to render [him] wholly and absolutely incompetent to comprehend and understand the nature of the transaction'” … . The incapacity must be shown to exist at the time the pertinent document was executed … . Regarding the statute of limitations issue, the toll for “insanity” provided by CPLR 208 is narrowly interpreted, the concept of insanity is “equated with unsoundness of mind” … and encompasses “only those individuals who are unable to protect their legal rights because of an over-all inability to function in society” … . The mental incapacity must exist at or be caused by the accident and continue during the relevant time … . Lynch v Carlozzi, 2015 NY Slip Op 04893, 3rd Dept 6-11-15

 

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