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Action for a Declaratory Judgment Must Be Based Upon a Concrete Dispute, Not the Mere Possibility of Prejudice—Complaint Properly Dismissed

In finding that the action for a declaratory judgment was properly dismissed, the Second Department explained that a declaratory judgment must be based upon a concrete dispute and may not be based upon merely hypothetical prejudice to the plaintiff.  Without a concrete dispute, the action seeks an impermissible advisory opinion:

An action for a declaratory judgment must be supported by the existence of a justiciable controversy (see CPLR 3001…). There must be a genuine, concrete dispute between adverse parties, not merely the possibility of hypothetical, contingent, or remote prejudice to the plaintiff … .

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, it failed to allege the existence of a justiciable controversy in this case, relying instead upon a hypothetical injury which would be contingent upon the occurrence of events which may or may not come to pass at some point in the future. Accordingly, the plaintiff sought an impermissible advisory opinion, and the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint … . Premier Restorations of N.Y. Corp. v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 2015 NY Slip Op 03339, 2nd Dept 4-22-15

 

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THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE ALLONGE, A SEPARATE PAPER, WAS FIRMLY ATTACHED TO THE NOTE, AS REQUIRED BY THE UCC; THEREFORE THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT HAD STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A UNIFIED TRIAL (LIABILITY AND DAMAGES) IN THIS PEDESTRIAN-VEHICLE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THE NATURE OF THE INJURIES WAS RELEVANT TO HOW THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED (SECOND DEPT).
JUDGE SHOULD NOT, SUA SPONTE, HAVE RAISED ISSUES ABOUT THE ADEQUACY OF SERVICE BY MAIL WHICH WERE NOT RAISED OR ADDRESSED BY THE PARTIES; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; AMENDED COMPLAINT, FOR WHICH LEAVE OF COURT WAS NOT SOUGHT, WAS A NULLITY (SECOND DEPT). ​
PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE GRAVES AMENDMENT, WHICH RELIEVES THE OWNER OF A LEASED VEHICLE FROM LIABILITY FOR A TRAFFIC ACCIDENT, DID NOT APPLY TO THE DEFENDANT OWNER; THEREFORE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​
No Appeal Lies from Direction to Settle Judgment on Notice
DEFINITION OF ‘PARENT’ IS THE SAME FOR PARENTAL ACCESS AND CUSTODY; JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DOCTRINES PRECLUDED SUPREME COURT’S FINDING THAT FATHER DID NOT HAVE STANDING IN THE CUSTODY MATTER (SECOND DEPT).
EXCESSIVE INTERFERENCE BY THE TRIAL JUDGE DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL; ISSUE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT).

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