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Under Powers Reserved to the Town by an 1818 Law, the Town Cannot Regulate Shoreline Dune Reconstruction and Erosion Control Undertaken by a Village within the Town

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined laws enacted in the early 1800’s prohibited the Town of Southampton from regulating shoreline activities such as dune restoration and erosion control undertaken by the Village (located within the Town):

The language of the 1818 Law “only relates to the use of the beach or shore, by taking seaweed from it and carting or transporting to and from or landing property on such shore” and “makes no reference to the management or regulation of the lands constituting the beach or shore . . . , but merely provides for the [Town’s] management and regulation of the waters, fisheries, and taking of seaweed and the productions of the waters” … . Accordingly, the Village was entitled to a judgment declaring, inter alia, that the [Town has] no lawful governmental or regulatory power to grant or deny permits in connection with (i) the placement and grading of sand and earth, and (ii) the development, construction, maintenance, and use of structures and lands located anywhere upon the ocean beaches situated within the boundaries of the Village. Semlear v Incorporated Vil. of Quogue, 2015 NY Slip Op 03345, 2nd Dept 4-22-15

 

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