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IF THE WORKER’S COMPENSATION BOARD FINDS A DEFENDANT IN A CONSTRUCTION-ACCIDENT ACTION WAS PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER, PLAINTIFF’S RECOVERY AGAINST THE EMPLOYER IS RESTRICTED TO WORKER’S COMPENSATION BENEFITS AND OTHER DEFENDANTS CANNOT MAINTAIN ACTIONS FOR CONTRIBUTION OR INDEMNIFICATION AGAINST THAT EMPLOYER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Wan, determined the employees were restricted to worker’s compensation benefits in this construction-accident action against their employers and the other defendants were precluded from seeking contribution and indemnification from the employers:

Workers’ Compensation Law § 11(1) precludes recovery by “any third person” against “[a]n employer” for contribution or indemnity “for injuries sustained by an employee acting within the scope of his or her employment” unless the employee “has sustained a ‘grave injury'” or there is a “written contract entered into prior to the accident or occurrence by which the employer had expressly agreed to contribution to or indemnification of the claimant.” Despite this clear directive, the Supreme Court, relying on this Court’s decision in Baten v Northfork Bancorporation, Inc. (85 AD3d 697), permitted cross-claims sounding in contribution and indemnity to survive against an entity on the ground that triable issues of fact existed with respect to whether that entity was an employer, regardless of a Workers’ Compensation Board determination on this issue. Here, we clarify that, notwithstanding our prior decision in Baten, no claim for indemnity or contribution may be maintained against an entity determined to be an employer by the Workers’ Compensation Board except in the limited circumstances specified in Workers’ Compensation Law § 11.* * *

… [W]e hold that Workers’ Compensation Law § 11 precludes recovery by any third party for contribution and indemnity against an entity determined by the WCB [Workers’ Compensation Board] to be the plaintiff’s employer except where the injured employee has suffered a grave injury or where the employer has expressly agreed in writing to contribute or indemnify.  Velazquez-Guadalupe v Ideal Bldrs. & Constr. Servs., Inc., 2023 NY Slip Op 02025, Second Dept 4-19-23

Practice Point: If the Workers’ Compensation Board determined a defendant in a construction-accident action was plaintiff’s employer, absent a “grave” injury or the employer’s agreement to contribute or indemnify, the plaintiff’s recovery is restricted to Workers’ Compensation benefits and there can be no recovery for contribution or indemnification against the employer by other defendants.

 

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