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COMMENCING A LAWSUIT, STANDING ALONE, DOES NOT CONSTITUTE ABUSE OF PROCESS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendants’ motion for summary judgment was properly granted, noting that commencing a lawsuit, standing alone, does not constitute abuse of process:

” Abuse of process has three essential elements: (1) regularly issued process, either civil or criminal, (2) an intent to do harm without excuse or justification, and (3) use of the process in a perverted manner to obtain a collateral objective'” … . The mere commencement of a lawsuit cannot serve as the basis for a cause of action alleging abuse of process … . “[T]here must be an unlawful interference with one’s person or property under color of process in order that action for abuse of process may lie” … . Lynn v McCormick, 2017 NY Slip Op 06169, Second Dept 8-16-17

INTENTIONAL TORTS (ABUSE OF PROCESS, COMMENCING A LAWSUIT, STANDING ALONE, DOES NOT CONSTITUTE ABUSE OF PROCESS (SECOND DEPT))/ABUSE OF PROCESS (COMMENCING A LAWSUIT, STANDING ALONE, DOES NOT CONSTITUTE ABUSE OF PROCESS (SECOND DEPT))

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