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Appeal Waiver Invalid/Court Erroneously Told Defendant His Request for a Hearing on the Persistent Violent Felony Offender Tolling Calculations Violated the Plea Agreement—Matter Remitted for a Hearing

The Fourth Department determined defendant’s waiver of appeal was invalid and defendant was entitled to a hearing on the time-calculations associated with the “persistent violent felony offender” status.  The ten-year period between the current felony and the prior felony is tolled by any periods of incarceration.  Defendant objected to the tolling calculations made by County Court. County Court effectively coerced defendant to agree to its tolling calculations by erroneously telling defendant his request for a hearing violated the plea agreement:

…[T]he waiver of the right to appeal is invalid inasmuch as there is no indication in the record that defendant understood that the waiver of the right to appeal was separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty … . We further agree with defendant that this case should be remitted for a hearing on the issue whether he is a persistent violent felony offender. A persistent violent felony offender is one who is convicted of a violent felony offense after having previously been subjected to two or more predicate violent felony convictions (see § 70.08 [1] [a]). The sentence upon the predicate violent felony convictions “must have been imposed not more than ten years before commission of the felony of which the defendant presently stands convicted” (§ 70.04 [1] [b] [iv]). However, “[i]n calculating the ten year period . . . , any period of time during which the person was incarcerated for any reason between the time of commission of the previous felony and the time of commission of the present felony shall be excluded and such ten year period shall be extended by a period or periods equal to the time served under such incarceration” (§ 70.04 [1] [b] [v]).

Here, defendant admitted that he was convicted of two prior violent felonies, but objected to the tolling periods that were computed by County Court pursuant to Penal Law § 70.04 (1) (b) (v) and requested a hearing. After some discussion with the court, defendant conceded that the court’s computations were correct, essentially waiving the necessity for a hearing. …[H]is waiver of the hearing was not effective because it was the product of impermissible coercion by the court. The court indicated that it could consider defendant’s request for a hearing to be a violation of the plea agreement, but that was not accurate. “While [the court] did advise defendant during the plea hearing that he was going to be sentenced as a [persistent violent] felony offender, it never specifically instructed him that admitting such [persistent violent] felony offender status was a condition of the plea agreement and that his failure to do so would result in a more severe sentence” … . People v Vanhooser, 2015 NY Slip Op 02640, 4th Dept 3-27-15

 

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