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IN THIS COMBINED ARTICLE 78 AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION, THE FOUR-MONTH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLICABLE TO ARTICLE 78 DID NOT APPLY TO THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION WHICH ONLY INVOLVED PRIVATE PARTIES, NOT A GOVERNMENT BODY OR OFFICER (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice NeMoyer, determined that the declaratory judgment action was not subject to the four-month statute of limitations for Article 78 actions. The plaintiff and defendant are private parties who own land on opposite sides of Cady Road. A portion of the Cady Road was declared discontinued and defendant allegedly erected a barrier. Plaintiff’s action sought Article 78 relief against a town official as well as a declaratory judgment. Because no Article 78 relief was possible with respect to the private defendant who allegedly erected the barrier, the shorter statute of limitations did not apply to the declaratory judgment action concerning the rights of the private parties:

Relief under CPLR article 78 is available only against a limited subset of official and institutional parties. It follows that the four-month statute of limitations applicable to article 78 proceedings cannot be imported to bar a declaratory judgment action against a private individual not subject to article 78. * * *

… [D]efendant is not a “body or officer” within the meaning of CPLR 7802 (a), i.e., he is not a “court, tribunal, board, corporation, [or] officer,” and it is well established that article 78 relief is available only against a “body or officer” as defined by section 7802 (a) … . …

… [T]he true gravamen of its declaratory claims “requires a judicial determination as to the rights of the parties to use Cady Road [which] would [thereby] settle the rights of private [parties],” i.e., plaintiff and defendant. And it is well established that such a contest between the “rights of private [parties]” cannot be adjudicated in an article 78 proceeding … . …

… [B]ecause an article 78 proceeding was not a “proper vehicle” for plaintiff’s private claims for declaratory relief against defendant, the four-month “limitations period set forth in CPLR 217 [1] is not applicable to [such claims] and the six-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (1) applies instead” … . Matter of Grocholski Cady Rd., LLC v Smith, 2019 NY Slip Op 01966, Fourth Dept 3-15-19

 

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