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Recommencement of A Dismissed Action Pursuant to CPLR 205 (a) Not Allowed Where Prior Action Was Dismissed for Neglect to Prosecute

The Second Department determined that dismissal of plaintiff's action for neglect to prosecute precluded the commencement of another identical action pursuant to CPLR 205 (a):

The Supreme Court correctly concluded that a prior action commenced by the plaintiff against the defendant, which asserted the same causes of action, was dismissed for the plaintiff's failure to obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant and neglect to prosecute, and that the order of dismissal entered in that action adequately set forth the conduct of the plaintiff that constituted the neglect and demonstrated a general pattern of delay in proceeding (see CPLR 205[a]). Accordingly, the court properly concluded that the plaintiff could not avail herself of CPLR 205(a), which provides that, under certain circumstances, an action that has been dismissed, albeit not on the merits, may be recommenced within six months after its dismissal… . Webb v Greater NY Auto Dealers Assn Inc, 2014 NY Slip Op 09121, 2nd Dept 12-31-14


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