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ALTHOUGH THE CHILD WAS 17 AND HAD A LONG STANDING PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP WITH MOTHER’S HUSBAND, THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN APPLIED TO DISMISS MOTHER’S PETITION FOR GENETIC MARKER TESTING TO DETERMINE PATERNITY; THE CHILD WAS AWARE FROM A YOUNG AGE THAT THE PUTATIVE FATHER WAS THE CHILD’S BIOLOGICAL FATHER AND THERE WAS NO SHOWING THE PATERNITY PETITION WAS NOT IN THE CHILD’S BEST INTERESTS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the doctrine of equitable estoppel should not have been applied to dismiss mother’s petition for a genetic marker test to determined paternity. The petition was brought when the child was 17 and the child was aware at a young age that the putative father was in fact the child’s biological father. The child had developed a parent-child relationship with mother’s husband, who had known the child since the child was two. The equitable estoppel doctrine is applied solely in the child’s best interests which were not shown to be detrimentally affected by the paternity petition:

As the party moving for dismissal of the petition, the putative father failed to establish that the child would suffer irreparable loss of status, destruction of his family image, or other harm to his physical or emotional well-being if a genetic marker test was ordered … . Here, the record reflects that the child was told by his mother and the husband at a young age that the putative father was his biological father. “Equitable estoppel is not used to deny the existence of a relationship, but rather to protect one” … . Absent any indication that the child’s relationship with the husband needed protection from a determination as to whether the putative father was the biological father, equitable estoppel was not available to the putative father as a remedy … . Thus, under the circumstances, any lack in diligence by the mother in pursuing her earlier petitions was not a basis to estop her from seeking to establish the putative father’s paternity … . Matter of Denise R.-D. v Julio R. P., 2020 NY Slip Op 00145, Second Dept 1-8-20

 

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