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Trial Testimony Rendered an Indictment Count Duplicitous Requiring Dismissal/Sexual Abuse First Degree Is Not a Lesser Included Offense Re: a Course of Sexual Conduct Against a Child First Degree

The Third Department determined that an indictment-count rendered duplicitous by the trial testimony should have been dismissed, and an indictment-count was wrongly amended because the new charge was not a lesser included offense re: the original charge:

As pertinent here, the crime of criminal sexual act in the first degree requires proof that the defendant engaged in oral sexual conduct with another person who is less than 11 years old, and oral sexual conduct includes “contact between . . . the mouth and the vulva or vagina” (Penal Law § 130.00 [2] [a]; see Penal Law § 130.50 [3]). The challenged count charged defendant with this crime based upon the victim's grand jury testimony that defendant had caused the victim to use her mouth to make contact with defendant's vaginal area on a single occasion in 2004. At trial, however, the victim testified that defendant caused her to engage in this conduct multiple times during the pertinent time period, and that she did not remember any specific time when it had happened. … Unfortunately, the … testimony regarding multiple acts made it impossible to ascertain the particular act upon which the jury verdict was based. We are therefore required, despite the utterly heinous nature of the acts the victim described, to reverse defendant's conviction on this charge; further, the challenged count must be dismissed… . …

While the People may seek to amend an indictment at any time during trial to correct “matters of form, time, place, names of persons and the like,” such an amendment may not alter the theory of prosecution reflected in the evidence before the grand jury (CPL 200.70 [1]; see CPL 200.70 [2]…). Further, a court may submit to a jury a lesser included offense of a crime charged in an indictment provided that the elements of the two crimes are such that “it is impossible to commit the greater crime without concomitantly committing the lesser offense by the same conduct [and] there [is] a reasonable view of the evidence to support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater” … . * * *

A crime is a lesser included offense of a charge of a higher degree only when in all circumstances, not only in those presented in the particular case, it is impossible to commit the greater crime without concomitantly, by the very same conduct, committing the lesser offense … . It is possible for a defendant to engage in an act of sexual conduct within the scope of the crime of course of sexual conduct against a child through an act of sexual contact, defined in pertinent part as “any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire of either party” (Penal Law § 130.00 [3]). However, a defendant could also commit an act of sexual conduct within the scope of the originally-charged offense by an act of “sexual intercourse, oral sexual conduct, anal sexual conduct, [or] aggravated sexual contact” (Penal Law § 130.00 [10]). The definitions of these acts do not include any element of intent; thus, it is possible for a defendant to commit an act that constitutes sexual conduct without the purpose of gratifying anyone's sexual desire that is a required element of sexual contact (see Penal Law § 130.00 [1], [2] [a], [b]; [11]…). Therefore, as it is possible to commit course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree without also committing sexual abuse in the first degree by the same conduct, defendant's conviction on that charge must be reversed, and the amended indictment count must be dismissed … . People v Baker, 2014 NY Slip Op 09068, 3rd Dept 12-31-14


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