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No “Special Employee” Relationship

In reinstating a jury verdict which determined a special employment relationship between plaintiff and defendant did not exist, the Second Department wrote:

“Workers’ Compensation Law §§ 11 and 29(6) provide that an employee who is entitled to receive compensation benefits may not sue his or her employer in an action at law for the injuries sustained” … . These exclusivity provisions also have been applied to shield from suit persons or entities other than the injured plaintiff’s direct employer …. For purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Law, a person may be deemed to have more than one employer, a general employer and a special employer … . The receipt of Workers’ Compensation benefits from a general employer precludes an employee from commencing a negligence action against a special employer … .

In determining whether a special employment relationship exists, “who controls and directs the manner, details and ultimate result of the employee’s work” is a “significant and weighty feature,” but is not determinative of the issue … . Indeed, “[m]any factors are to be considered when deciding whether such a special employment relationship exists and not one factor is decisive” … . Other principal factors to be considered include “who is responsible for the payment of wages and the furnishing of equipment, who has the right to discharge the employee, and whether the work being performed was in furtherance of the special employer’s or the general employer’s business” … . General employment will be presumed to continue unless there is a “clear demonstration of surrender of control by the general employer and assumption of control by the special employer” ….  Pena v Automatic Data Processing, Inc, 2013 NY Slip Op 02552, 2011-10265, Index No 7894/06, 2nd Dept 4-17-13

 

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