You are here: / / Law of Contracts, Not Law of Torts, Applied to Conflict of Laws Analysis...
,

Law of Contracts, Not Law of Torts, Applied to Conflict of Laws Analysis Concerning Motor Vehicle Insurance Policy

The Second Department determined the law of contracts, as opposed to the law of torts, controlled which state law applied.  The case involved a car accident in Florida and an insurance policy issued in New York:

It is undisputed that this conflict of law question, although arising in the context of a motor vehicle accident, must be resolved by the conflict of law rules relevant to contracts, not torts … . Generally, “the courts apply the more flexible center of gravity’ or grouping of contacts’ inquiry, which permits consideration of the spectrum of significant contacts’ in order to determine which State has the most significant contacts to the particular contract dispute” … . “In general, significant contacts in a case involving contracts, in addition to the place of contracting, are the place of negotiation and performance, the location of the subject matter of the contract, and the domicile or place of business of the contracting parties” … . As to insurance contracts specifically, significance has been attached to the ” local law of the state which the parties understood was to be the principal location of the insured risk . . . unless with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 [of the Restatement] to the transaction and the parties'” … . In the case of a noncommercial vehicle, which is by its nature mobile, the principal location of the insured risk is the place where the vehicle is to be principally garaged … .

Here, as the Supreme Court correctly noted, the insurance contract at issue was written to conform to the laws, rules and regulations of New York State, and was obtained in New York by Brand, a New York resident, from an insurance company doing business in New York. Furthermore, Brand served the demand for SUM [supplemental uninsured/underinsured motorist] arbitration upon the American Arbitration Association in New York. Applying the grouping of contacts inquiry to these facts, New York has the most significant contacts with the parties and the contract. Indeed, such a conclusion would be in conformity with the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties. Matter of Unitrin Direct/Warner Ins co v Brand, 2014 NY Slip Op 05887, 2nd Dept 8-20-14

 

You might also like
No Allegation of Active Concealment of Defects on Part of Seller/Buyer Can Not Sue for Defects Discovered after the Closing Based Solely Upon Seller’s Silence
ABSENT A STIPULATION BY THE PARTIES, FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE WITHDRAWN THE FAMILY OFFENSE PETITION (SECOND DEPT). ​
A FOREIGN DEFAULT JUDGMENT MAY BE ACCORDED FULL FAITH AND CREDIT IN NEW YORK BY A PLENARY ACTION OR A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN LIEU OF COMPLAINT; THERE IS NO NEED FOR PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT (SECOND DEPT).
STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE OF FORECLOSURE PROVISIONS IN RPAPL 1304 IS REQUIRED; HERE THE BANK FAILED TO SHOW THAT IT SENT RPAPL 1304 NOTICES ADDRESSED INDIVIDUALLY TO DEFENDANTS (SECOND DEPT).
SUPREME COURT WAS WITHOUT POWER TO DIRECT DISMISSAL OF THE FORECLOSURE ACTION FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE BECAUSE A 90-DAY NOTICE HAD NOT BEEN SERVED (SECOND DEPT).
PLAYGROUND EQUIPMENT ON WHICH PLAINTIFF’S SON WAS INJURED, ACCORDING TO EXPERT EVIDENCE, WAS IN COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE GUIDELINES AND STANDARDS, WAS PROPERLY MAINTAINED AND WAS NONHAZARDOUS, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
THE ZONE OF DANGER THEORY OF LIABILITY IS AVAILABLE ONLY TO THE IMMEDIATE RELATIVES OF THE INJURED PARTY; PETITIONERS’ CHILDREN WITNESSED THE FATAL INJURY TO ANOTHER STUDENT WHO WAS NOT RELATED; PETITIONERS’ REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST THE SCHOOL DISTRICT ALLEGING INTENTIONAL AND NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD ON THE SEXUAL PREDATOR DESIGNATION WHICH THE JUDGE IMPOSED SUA SPONTE, DESIGNATION DELETED (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Child’s Move To Connecticut Did Not Strip New York of Jurisdiction and... Labor Law 200 Action Is Not Based Upon Supervision or Control of Plaintiff’s...