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Labor Law 200 Action Is Not Based Upon Supervision or Control of Plaintiff’s Work, But Rather on the Property Owner’s Creation or Failure to Remedy a Dangerous Condition

The Second Department noted that a negligence case of action pursuant to Labor Law 200 is not based upon supervision or control over the plaintiff’s work, but rather is based upon whether the property owner (the Town)ncreated or failed to remedy a dangerous condition:

The Supreme Court also properly denied those branches of the Town’s motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence causes of action insofar as asserted against it. Before the Supreme Court and on appeal, in support of these branches of its motion, the Town focused exclusively upon its alleged lack of supervision of, or control over, the plaintiff’s work. That argument is only relevant where the claimed injury arises from the manner in which the work is performed … . Where, as here, the injury arises from an allegedly defective or dangerous condition on the premises, the allegedly unsecured and improperly stored electrical wire, a property owner will be liable under a theory of common-law negligence, as codified by Labor Law § 200, when the owner created the alleged dangerous or defective condition, or failed to remedy a dangerous or defective condition of which it had actual or constructive notice … . Baumann v Town of Islip, 2014 NY Slip Op 05825, 2nd Dept 8-20-14

 

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