You are here: / / Labor Law 200 Action Is Not Based Upon Supervision or Control of Plaintiff’s...

Labor Law 200 Action Is Not Based Upon Supervision or Control of Plaintiff’s Work, But Rather on the Property Owner’s Creation or Failure to Remedy a Dangerous Condition

The Second Department noted that a negligence case of action pursuant to Labor Law 200 is not based upon supervision or control over the plaintiff’s work, but rather is based upon whether the property owner (the Town)ncreated or failed to remedy a dangerous condition:

The Supreme Court also properly denied those branches of the Town’s motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence causes of action insofar as asserted against it. Before the Supreme Court and on appeal, in support of these branches of its motion, the Town focused exclusively upon its alleged lack of supervision of, or control over, the plaintiff’s work. That argument is only relevant where the claimed injury arises from the manner in which the work is performed … . Where, as here, the injury arises from an allegedly defective or dangerous condition on the premises, the allegedly unsecured and improperly stored electrical wire, a property owner will be liable under a theory of common-law negligence, as codified by Labor Law § 200, when the owner created the alleged dangerous or defective condition, or failed to remedy a dangerous or defective condition of which it had actual or constructive notice … . Baumann v Town of Islip, 2014 NY Slip Op 05825, 2nd Dept 8-20-14

 

You might also like
Violation of Confrontation Clause Was Harmless Error
Unwed Birth Father’s Consent for Adoption Properly Required
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE RENDERED THIS DENTAL MALPRACTICE ACTION TIMELY; PLAINTIFF STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT BASED ON THE PROMISED OUTCOME OF THE DENTAL WORK (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFFS OBTAINED A NEW JERSEY DEFAULT JUDGMENT IN A BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION AGAINST THREE DEFENDANTS WHO ARE JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE; PLANTIFFS NEED ONLY SERVE ONE OF THE DEFENDANTS TO ENFORCE THE FOREIGN JUDGMENT AGAINST THAT DEFENDANT (SECOND DEPT).
INDUSTRIAL CODE PROVISION REQUIRING THAT SAFETY DEVICES BE KEPT SOUND AND OPERABLE CONSTITUTED A CONCRETE PREDICATE FOR A LABOR LAW 241 (6) CAUSE OF ACTION WHICH ALLEGED INJURY DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A “PROTECTOR” ON A GRINDER.
DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL WHEN THE JUDGE TOLD HIM NOT TO DISCUSS HIS TRIAL TESTIMONY WITH DEFENSE COUNSEL DURING A TWO-DAY ADJOURNMENT; ALTHOUGH THE LEGAL-SUFFICIENCY AND RIGHT-TO-COUNSEL ISSUES WERE NOT PRESERVED, THE APPEAL WAS HEARD IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT).
ANALYTICAL CRITERIA FOR MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION, WHERE DEFENDANT SUBMITS EVIDENCE, CLEARLY EXPLAINED; PLAINTIFF IS NOT PENALIZED FOR NOT SUBMITTING EVIDENCE IN OPPOSITION; BURDEN NEVER SHIFTS TO PLAINTIFF.
VILLAGE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT CREATE THE CONDITION WHICH LED TO PLAINTIFF’S TRIP AND FALL, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Law of Contracts, Not Law of Torts, Applied to Conflict of Laws Analysis Concerning... Even Though the Appeal Had Been Rendered Moot, It Was Appropriate for the Appellate...