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BEFORE SUING A TORTFEASOR’S INSURER, PLAINTIFF MUST OBTAIN A JUDGMENT AGAINST THE TORTFEASOR (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant insurer’s motion to dismiss the complaint in this personal injury action should have been granted. The injured plaintiff sued the tortfeasor’s insurer before obtaining a judgment against the tortfeasor (the insured):

Insurance Law § 3420 “grants an injured party a right to sue the tortfeasor’s insurer, but only under limited circumstances—the injured party must first obtain a judgment against the tortfeasor, serve the insurance company with a copy of the judgment and await payment for 30 days” … . Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that the plaintiff lacked standing to commence this action by submitting the complaint, which alleged that the underlying action against [the tortfeasor] “is currently pending.” The complaint is evidence that the plaintiff has not established the condition precedent to maintain a direct action against the defendants (see Insurance Law § 3420[a][2] …). Sizova v Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2023 NY Slip Op 03502, Second Dept 6-28-23

Practice Point: A plaintiff must obtain a judgment against the tortfeasor before the tortfeasor’s insurer can be sued.

 

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