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Child’s Move To Connecticut Did Not Strip New York of Jurisdiction and Did Not Justify Finding that New York Was an Inconvenient Forum

The Second Department determined Family Court erred when it determined the child’s moving to Connecticut removed the child from its jurisdiction.  The court further noted that Family Court erred when it state that, even if it had jurisdiction, it would decline to exercise it.  The Second Department determined the analysis of the statutory factors favored New York’s continued jurisdiction:

Pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, codified in Article 5-A of the Domestic Relations Law (hereinafter UCCJEA), a court in this State that has made an initial custody determination has exclusive continuing jurisdiction over that determination until it finds, as is relevant here, that the child does not have a “significant connection” with New York, and “substantial evidence is no longer available in this state concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships” (Domestic Relations Law § 76-a[1][a]…). Here, while the subject child moved to Connecticut to live with her father approximately eight months before the mother petitioned to modify a prior order of custody so as to award her sole custody of the child, the record reveals that the child retained a significant connection to New York, including attending school and having frequent visitation with her mother in New York, and that substantial evidence was available in this state concerning her present and future welfare … . The child’s significant connection to Connecticut does not diminish her significant connection to New York as well … .

A court of this State that has jurisdiction under the UCCJEA may decline to exercise it if it finds that New York is an inconvenient forum and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum (see Domestic Relations Law § 76-f[1]…). However, the court is required to consider the factors set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 76-f(2)(a)-(h) before determining that New York is an inconvenient forum … . The Family Court failed to do so here. However, we need not remit the matter to the Family Court, Queens County, for consideration of the statutory factors because the record is sufficient for this Court to consider and evaluate those factors … . Consideration of the relevant statutory factors, including the nature and location of relevant evidence, and the Family Court’s greater familiarity than the courts of Connecticut with the facts and issues underlying the mother’s modification petition, supports a conclusion that New York is not an inconvenient forum … . Matter of Mojica v Denson, 2014 NY Slip Op 05882, 2nd Dept 8-20-14

 

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