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REAL ESTATE BROKER ENTITLED TO COMMISSION, DEFENDANTS TERMINATED THE BROKER’S SERVICES IN BAD FAITH JUST BEFORE ENTERING THE LEASE AGREEMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff real estate broker was entitled to a commission on a lease entered by defendants (Budhu and RLRC) just after defendants terminated plaintiff’s services, an action deemed to have been done in bad fact warranting recovery under an implied contract theory and in quantum meruit:

A real estate broker is entitled to recover a commission upon establishing that it (1) is duly licensed, (2) had a contract, express or implied, with the party to be charged with paying the commission, and (3) was the procuring cause of the transaction … . There is no dispute that the plaintiff is a licensed brokerage firm. …

The plaintiff established that it had an implied contract to provide brokerage services for Budhu and RLRC. The plaintiff also established that it was the procuring cause of the transaction. In order to establish that it was the procuring cause of a transaction, a “broker must establish that there was a direct and proximate link, as distinguished from one that is indirect and remote, between the bare introduction and the consummation” … . While the plaintiff was not involved in the negotiations leading up to the completion of the deal between RLRC and Hillside, it established that it created an amicable atmosphere in which negotiations proceeded, and that it generated a chain of circumstances that proximately led to the transaction… . Even if the plaintiff were not the procuring cause of the transaction, it would still be entitled to recover a commission, as the evidence established that Budhu and RLRC terminated the plaintiff’s activities in bad faith and as a mere last-minute device to escape the payment of the commission … .

Moreover, even assuming that there was no contract, express or implied, between the parties, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover for its services in quantum meruit in order to avoid the unjust enrichment of Budhu and RLRC … . The plaintiff established that it performed services in good faith, that Budhu and RLRC accepted the services, that it expected to be compensated therefor, and the reasonable value of the services … . Gluck & Co. Realtors, LLC v Burger King Corp., 2018 NY Slip Op 05668, Second Dept 8-8-18

REAL ESTATE (REAL ESTATE BROKER ENTITLED TO COMMISSION, DEFENDANTS TERMINATED THE BROKER’S SERVICES IN BAD FAITH JUST BEFORE ENTERING THE LEASE AGREEMENT (SECOND DEPT))/BROKER’S COMMISSION (REAL ESTATE BROKER ENTITLED TO COMMISSION, DEFENDANTS TERMINATED THE BROKER’S SERVICES IN BAD FAITH JUST BEFORE ENTERING THE LEASE AGREEMENT (SECOND DEPT))/COMMISSION  (REAL ESTATE BROKER ENTITLED TO COMMISSION, DEFENDANTS TERMINATED THE BROKER’S SERVICES IN BAD FAITH JUST BEFORE ENTERING THE LEASE AGREEMENT (SECOND DEPT))CONTRACT LAW (REAL ESTATE BROKER ENTITLED TO COMMISSION, DEFENDANTS TERMINATED THE BROKER’S SERVICES IN BAD FAITH JUST BEFORE ENTERING THE LEASE AGREEMENT (SECOND DEPT))

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