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Statement Identifying Shooter Made by a Witness Who Did Not See the Shooting Should Not Have Been Admitted Under the Present Sense Impression Exception to the Hearsay Rule

In a decision which affirmed the conviction and addressed several other important evidentiary issues, the Fourth Department noted that a statement identifying the defendant as the shooter made by a witness who did not see the shooting should not have been admitted under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule:

It is well settled that, in order “[t]o qualify as a present sense impression, the out-of-court statement must be (1) made by a person perceiving the event as it is unfolding or immediately afterward . . . , and (2) corroborated by independent evidence establishing the reliability of the contents of the statement” (id. at 382). Here, the witness did not see the shooting, and he confirmed defendant’s identity as the shooter only after questioning the victim (see People v Vasquez, 88 NY2d 561, 580; see also People v Brown, 104 AD3d 1203, 1204, lv denied 21 NY3d 1014). Therefore, the witness’s statement was not admissible as a present sense impression, and we conclude that the admission of that statement in evidence improperly bolstered the victim’s identification of defendant as the shooter … . People v Mulligan, 2014 NY Slip Op 04588, 4th Dept 6-20-14

 

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