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COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS DOG BITE CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; NO EVIDENCE SHELTER PERSONNEL WERE AWARE OF VICIOUS PROPENSITIES; HEALTH DEPARTMENT’S KNOWLEDGE THE DOG HAD BITTEN SOMEONE ELSE NOT IMPUTED TO SHELTER PERSONNEL; NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED.

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the county’s motion for summary judgment in this dog bite case should have been granted. Plaintiff was a volunteer who walked dogs held at the county animal shelter. She was bitten by one of the dogs. There was no showing the shelter personnel were aware of the dog’s vicious propensities. The fact that the health department was aware the dog had bitten someone else in a prior incident was not imputed to the shelter personnel. The Fourth Department also held Supreme Court should not have denied the county’s motion to dismiss the negligence cause of action. Negligence does not lie in dog bite cases:

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the fact that shelter personnel may have been informed at the time of the dog’s surrender that the dog had previously knocked over a child is insufficient to raise an issue of fact as to the dog’s vicious propensities to bite. Although a tendency to knock a person over may reflect “a proclivity to act in a way that puts others at risk of harm” (Collier, 1 NY3d at 447), plaintiff’s injuries were not caused by the dog’s knocking her over, and the dog’s proclivity to do so, even if established, did not “result[] in the injury giving rise to the lawsuit”… .

We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, any knowledge of that incident obtained by … [the] Health Department should not be imputed to the County or the shelter … . “A municipality often will have numerous employees assigned to separate and diverse agencies or departments” … , and the record demonstrates that there is no overlap in the respective scopes of authority of the Health Department and the shelter.

We further conclude that the court erred in denying the County’s motion with respect to plaintiff’s negligence cause of action. “[C]ases involving injuries inflicted by domestic animals may only proceed under strict liability based on the owner’s knowledge of the animal’s vicious propensities, not on theories of common-law negligence” … . Blake v County of Wyo., 2017 NY Slip Op 00826, 4th Dept 2-3-17

 

ANIMAL LAW (COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS DOG BITE CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, NO EVIDENCE SHELTER PERSONNEL WERE AWARE OF VICIOUS PROPENSITIES, HEALTH DEPARTMENT’S KNOWLEDGE THE DOG HAD BITTEN SOMEONE ELSE NOT IMPUTED TO SHELTER PERSONNEL, NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/MUNICIPAL LAW (COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS DOG BITE CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, NO EVIDENCE SHELTER PERSONNEL WERE AWARE OF VICIOUS PROPENSITIES, HEALTH DEPARTMENT’S KNOWLEDGE THE DOG HAD BITTEN SOMEONE ELSE NOT IMPUTED TO SHELTER PERSONNEL, NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/DOG BITES (COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS DOG BITE CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, NO EVIDENCE SHELTER PERSONNEL WERE AWARE OF VICIOUS PROPENSITIES, HEALTH DEPARTMENT’S KNOWLEDGE THE DOG HAD BITTEN SOMEONE ELSE NOT IMPUTED TO SHELTER PERSONNEL, NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)

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