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TRANSFER OF LAND TO A TRUST PURSUANT TO THE ONEIDA SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT DID NOT CEDE THE STATE’S TAXATION AUTHORITY; MOTION TO DISMISS A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION WILL BE TREATED AS A MOTION FOR A DECLARATION IN DEFENDANT’S FAVOR.

The Fourth Department determined a citizen taxpayer’s declaratory judgment action against the state, claiming that the transfer of land to a trust pursuant to the Oneida Settlement Agreement ceded the state’s taxation authority, was properly rejected. The court noted that when a motion to dismiss a declaratory judgment action is made, the court will treat it as a motion for a declaration in the defendant’s favor:

Plaintiff alleges that Section VI B (1-5) of the Agreement violates article XVI of the State Constitution, which prohibits the State from surrendering, suspending or contracting away its power of taxation. Section VI B (1-5) provides that the State will not oppose a future application by the Oneida Indian Nation (Nation) to transfer to the United States up to 12,366 acres of land to be held in trust pursuant to 25 USC § 5108 (formerly § 465). The land at issue was formerly part of the 300,000-acre reservation, which was established in the 1788 Treaty of Fort Schuyler (see City of Sherrill, N.Y. v Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 US 197, 203), and which the Nation has reacquired through open-market transactions (see id. at 211). In 2008, the United States Secretary of the Interior accepted the transfer into trust of 13,004 acres of reacquired land owned by the Nation, over defendant’s objection. We conclude that the court properly declared that Section VI B (1-5) does not violate the State constitutional provision prohibiting defendant from surrendering or contracting away its power of taxation. * * *

To the extent that plaintiff contends that Executive Law § 11 and Indian Law § 16 violate article XVI of the State Constitution, we reject that contention. Kaplan v State of New York. 2017 NY Slip Op 00766, 4th Dept 2-3-17

 

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (STATE) (TRANSFER OF LAND TO A TRUST PURSUANT TO THE ONEIDA SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT DID NOT CEDE THE STATE’S TAXATION AUTHORITY, MOTION TO DISMISS A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION WILL BE TREATED AS A MOTION FOR A DECLARATION IN DEFENDANT’S FAVOR)/INDIAN LAW (TRANSFER OF LAND TO A TRUST PURSUANT TO THE ONEIDA SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT DID NOT CEDE THE STATE’S TAXATION AUTHORITY, MOTION TO DISMISS A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION WILL BE TREATED AS A MOTION FOR A DECLARATION IN DEFENDANT’S FAVOR)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, (TRANSFER OF LAND TO A TRUST PURSUANT TO THE ONEIDA SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT DID NOT CEDE THE STATE’S TAXATION AUTHORITY, MOTION TO DISMISS A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION WILL BE TREATED AS A MOTION FOR A DECLARATION IN DEFENDANT’S FAVOR)/DECLARATORY JUDGMENT (TRANSFER OF LAND TO A TRUST PURSUANT TO THE ONEIDA SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT DID NOT CEDE THE STATE’S TAXATION AUTHORITY, MOTION TO DISMISS A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION WILL BE TREATED AS A MOTION FOR A DECLARATION IN DEFENDANT’S FAVOR)

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