You are here: / / Statutory Attorney’s Fees Awarded in a Human Rights Law Action Should...
, ,

Statutory Attorney’s Fees Awarded in a Human Rights Law Action Should Not Be Added to the Jury Award to Determine the Amount of the Contingency Fee

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Lippman, explained how attorney’s fees should be calculated when there is a contingency fee agreement which does not make clear how the contingency fee is affected by the award of statutory attorney’s fees (in addition to the jury award) pursuant to the Human Rights Law.  The attorney claimed that the contingency should be calculated after adding the statutory fees to the jury award. The court disagreed:

…[B]oth federal precedent and instructive decisions from our sister states evince that,”absent a contractual provision to the contrary, the trend is to calculate the contingency fee based on the amount of the judgment exclusive of the fee award, and then credit the fee award to the client as an offset against the contingency fee owed. Under this approach, the attorney should be entitled to receive either the contingent fee calculated on the amount of the damage recovery exclusive of any court-awarded fees, or the amount of the court-awarded fee, whichever is greater”… .

In the context of the present case, concerning construction of retainer agreements in conjunction with attorneys’ fees awarded pursuant to the NYCHRL (New York city Human Rights Law), such an approach comports with our precedent holding that ambiguous fee agreements should be interpreted against the drafting attorney … .

In addition, permitting counsel to collect a statutory award that exceeds the amount due under a contingency fee agreement advances the “uniquely broad and remedial purpose” of the NYCHRL by incentivizing the private bar to represent civil rights plaintiffs even where any damage award is likely to be insubstantial … . In this regard, freedom of contract is also respected since, in the event that the statutory award is less than the contingency fee, deducting the court-awarded fees from the sum owed under the contract ensures that the attorney receives, and the client pays, no more or less than they bargained for … .

On the facts before us, we need not decide whether a retainer agreement entitling an attorney to court-ordered counsel fees in addition to the full contingency fee would be enforceable. We would note, however, that such an arrangement would be subject to requisite scrutiny under applicable laws and rules controlling the reasonableness of attorney compensation… .  Albunio v City of New York, 2014 NY Slip Op 02325, CtApp 4-3-14

 

You might also like
STATEMENTS ALLEGING MAFIA INVOLVEMENT IN A STRIP CLUB WERE NOT “OF AND CONCERNING” INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS WHO PROVIDED FOOD, BEVERAGE AND TALENT SERVICES TO THE CLUB.
FORMULAIC LANGUAGE INDICATING THE ACCEPTANCE OF A BID WAS SUBJECT TO A WRITTEN AGREEMENT AND DEPOSIT DID NOT NEGATE THE FORMATION OF A BINDING CONTRACT UPON ACCEPTANCE.
In an Action Stemming from the Purchase of Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, the Breach of Defendant’s Representations and Warranties Concerning the Borrowers’ Incomes, Occupancy Status and Debt Obligations Occurred on the Date the Contract Was Executed (Starting the Six-Year Statute of Limitations at that Point)—Defendant’s Obligation to Cure or Repurchase Did Not Constitute a Second Contract—Defendant’s Refusal to Cure or Repurchase, Therefore, Did Not Start the Running of Another Six-Year Limitations Period
THE USE OF TRANSLATORS TO DOCUMENT INFORMATION IN AN ACCUSATORY INSTRUMENT DID NOT RENDER THE INSTRUMENTS FACIALLY INSUFFICIENT BY ADDING A LAYER OF HEARSAY (CT APP). ​
THE RECORD WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ALLOW THE CONCLUSION THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT RECEIVE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, A POST-TRIAL EVIDENTIARY PROCEEDING MIGHT ANSWER THE QUESTIONS LEFT OPEN BY THE TRIAL RECORD; ANY ERROR IN ADMITTING DNA EVIDENCE WHERE CONSENT, NOT IDENTITY, IS THE ISSUE IS HARMLESS (CT APP).
PLAINTIFF STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE CORRECTION LAW BY ALLEGING HIS APPLICATION FOR REEMPLOYMENT AFTER COMPLETION OF HIS SENTENCE (60 DAYS INCARCERATION) WAS DENIED SOLELY BECAUSE OF HIS PRIOR CONVICTION (CT APP).
Application of the Emergency Doctrine Presented a Mixed Question of Law and Fact which Could Not Be Reviewed by the Court of Appeals
AFTER A VALID TRAFFIC STOP, DEFENDANT WAS DETAINED WHILE HIS PAROLE OFFICER WAS CALLED TO THE SCENE; DEFENDANT’S CAR WAS THEN SEARCHED AND HEROIN WAS FOUND; THE MATTER WAS REMITTED TO DETERMINE WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY DETAINED UNDER THE “REASONABLE SUSPICION” STANDARD, NOT THE “RIGHT TO INQUIRE” STANDARD APPLIED BY THE SUPPRESSION COURT (CT APP). ​

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

A Forged Deed Is Void Ab Initio and Conveys Nothing to a Bona Fide Purchaser... Notice Requirements for a Nonparty Subpoena Pursuant to CPLR 3101(a)(4) Explained/Criteria...