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AFTER A VALID TRAFFIC STOP, DEFENDANT WAS DETAINED WHILE HIS PAROLE OFFICER WAS CALLED TO THE SCENE; DEFENDANT’S CAR WAS THEN SEARCHED AND HEROIN WAS FOUND; THE MATTER WAS REMITTED TO DETERMINE WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY DETAINED UNDER THE “REASONABLE SUSPICION” STANDARD, NOT THE “RIGHT TO INQUIRE” STANDARD APPLIED BY THE SUPPRESSION COURT (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, remitting the case for a determination of the suppression motion under the “reasonable suspicion” standard, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Cannataro, over an extensive dissenting opinion, determined there was a question whether the defendant was illegally detained after a valid traffic stop to allow investigation of a possible parole violation. The parole officer was called to the scene, the defendant’s car was searched, and heroin was found:

The proper standard for detaining an individual beyond “the time reasonably required” to complete a traffic stop is reasonable suspicion … . Given that a traffic stop is a “limited seizure” of the occupants of a vehicle, “[f]or a traffic stop to pass constitutional muster, the officer’s action in stopping the vehicle must be justified at its inception and the seizure must be reasonably related in scope, including its length, to the circumstances which justified the detention in the first instance” … . A “continued involuntary detention of [a] defendant . . . constitute[s] a seizure in violation of their constitutional rights, unless circumstances coming to [the officer’s] attention following the initial stop furnishe[s] . . . reasonable suspicion that they were engaged in criminal activity” … . Likewise, the United States Supreme Court has held that “[a] seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation . . . become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission of issuing a ticket for the violation” … . In this vein, although that “mission” encompasses ” ‘ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop,’ ” it does not include additional measures designed to detect evidence of criminality … . Thus, an otherwise lawful traffic stop may not be prolonged “absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual” … .

… [T]here is record support for the affirmed finding that the traffic stop was justified at its inception, based upon the police officer’s observation that defendant committed a traffic infraction … . However, the courts below evaluated whether the traffic stop was prolonged beyond the time reasonably required for its completion under the founded suspicion standard applicable to the common law right to inquire … , a lesser standard than the reasonable suspicion necessary to prolong a traffic stop. As a result, remittal is necessary to allow for consideration of this issue under the proper standard. People v Thomas, 2024 NY Slip Op 03319, CtApp 6-18-24

Practice Point: After a valid traffic stop, the question whether defendant was properly detained to allow inquiry into suspected crimes unrelated to the traffic infraction is analyzed under the “reasonable suspicion” standard, not the lesser “right to inquire” standard.

 

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