The Court of Appeals, reversing defendant’s conviction, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Feinman, determined that the trial court’s analysis of the defense request for a missing witness jury instruction improperly shifted the burden to the defendant to show that the testimony would not be cumulative. The witness, Dees, was with the shooting victim and was shot himself. The witness was the first to see the shooter in a car that passed by and tried to push the shooter away when the shooter approached:
In Gonzalez [68 NY2d 424], we established the analytical framework for deciding a request for a missing witness instruction. The proponent initially must demonstrate only three things via a prompt request for the charge: (1) “that there is an uncalled witness believed to be knowledgeable about a material issue pending in the case,” (2) “that such witness can be expected to testify favorably to the opposing party,” and (3) “that such party has failed to call” the witness to testify … . The party opposing the charge can defeat the initial showing by accounting for the witness’s absence or demonstrating that the charge would not be appropriate … . “This burden can be met by demonstrating,” among other things, that “the testimony would be cumulative to other evidence” … . If the party opposing the charge meets its burden by rebutting the prima facie showing, the proponent retains the ultimate burden to show that the charge would be appropriate … . We have repeatedly reiterated Gonzalez’s specific burden-shifting analysis … , but we have never required the proponent of a missing witness charge to negate cumulativeness to meet the prima facie burden … . * * *
Given that defendant, as the proponent of the missing witness charge, met his initial burden, the People were required to rebut that showing by establishing why the charge was inappropriate. They failed to do so. The People simply asserted, without explanation, that Dees’s testimony on the issue of identification would be cumulative because “there is absolutely no indication that [Dees] would be able to provide anything that wasn’t provided by [the victim].” This conclusory argument was insufficient to satisfy the People’s burden in response to defendant’s prima facie showing … . … Dees’s testimony would not have been “trivial or cumulative”; due to inconsistencies in the victim’s descriptions of the incident and what the shooter was wearing, the issue of identification was “in sharp dispute . . . and the testimony of the only additional person who was present [during the shooting] might have made the difference” … . People v Smith, 2019 NY Slip Op 04447, CtApp 6-6-19