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TESTIMONY SUPPORTING THE ADMISSION OF DNA PROFILES WAS HEARSAY WHICH VIOLATED THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, reversing defendant’s conviction, over a concurrence, determined the testimony which formed the basis for the admission in evidence of DNA profiles was hearsay which violated the Confrontation Clause:

In People v John, we held that, when confronted with testimonial DNA evidence at trial, a defendant is entitled to cross-examine “an analyst who witnessed, performed or supervised the generation of defendant’s DNA profile, or who used his or her independent analysis on the raw data” (27 NY3d 294, 315 [2016]). In People v Austin, we reiterated that a testifying analyst who did not participate in the generation of a testimonial DNA profile satisfies the Confrontation Clause’s requirements only if the analyst “used his or her independent analysis on the raw data to arrive at his or her own conclusions” (30 NY3d 98, 105 [2017] … ). The records before us do not establish that the testifying analyst had such a role in either case. Accordingly, because the analyst’s hearsay testimony as to the DNA profiles developed from the post-arrest buccal swabs “easily satisfies the primary purpose test” for determining whether evidence is testimonial … , we conclude that her testimony and the admission of those DNA profiles into evidence, over defendants’ objections, violated defendants’ confrontation rights. People v Tsintzelis, 2020 NY Slip Op 02026, CtApp 3-24-20

 

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