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Purported Lack of Standing Is Not a Jurisdictional Defect/Sua Sponte Dismissal of Complaint Reversed

In reversing Supreme Court, the Second Department noted that a court’s power to dismiss a complaint sua sponte should rarely be used and further noted that a purported lack of standing is not a jurisdictional defect warranting sua sponte dismissal:

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in, sua sponte, directing the dismissal of the complaint. ” A court’s power to dismiss a complaint, sua sponte, is to be used sparingly and only when extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant dismissal'” … . Here, there were no extraordinary circumstances warranting sua sponte dismissal of the complaint. Moreover, the defendants, having failed to answer the complaint or make pre-answer motions to dismiss the complaint, waived the defense of lack of standing … . “Furthermore, a party’s lack of standing does not constitute a jurisdictional defect and does not warrant sua sponte dismissal of a complaint by the court”… .  Onewest Bank FSB v Fernandez, 2013 NY Slip Op 08233, 2nd Dept 12-11-13

 

 

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