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PLAINTIFF FATHER WAS AWARDED SOLE CUSTODY OF THE CHILD IN AN ORDER THAT DIRECTED MOTHER TO “STAY AWAY” FROM FATHER AND CHILD; FATHER ASKED THE POLICE FOR HELP IN SERVING THE ORDER AND PICKING UP THE CHLID; MOTHER WOULD NOT LET THE POLICE INTO HER HOME; DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ADVISED THAT THE POLICE COULD NOT ENTER MOTHER’S HOME; THE NEXT DAY MOTHER MURDERED THE CHILD; THE COMPLAINT AGAINST THE MUNICIPAL DEFENDANTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DIISMISSED; PLAINTIFF DEMONSTRATED A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MUNICIPALITY AND THE MUNICIPALITY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT WAS ENTITLED TO GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION IMMUNITY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Taylor, determined the negligence and wrongful death action against the municipal defendants should not have been dismissed, and plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the notice of claim or leave to file a late notice of claim should have been granted. Plaintiff father was granted sole custody of his child in an order which required mother to “stay away” from father and the child. Plaintiff asked the police for help in serving the order on mother and picking up the child. The police attempted to serve the order, but mother slammed the door and would not let them in. District attorneys were then contacted for advice but determined the police could not enter mother’s home. The next day the police were called to mother’s home where the child was found deceased. Mother was convicted of murdering the child. The Second Department held that there was a special relationship between plaintiff and the municipality and the municipality was not entitled to governmental function immunity: The opinion is too complex to fairly summarize here:

To establish the existence of a special relationship, a plaintiff is required to prove four elements, also referred to as “the Cuffy factors” or “the Cuffy test,” namely:

“(1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality’s agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact between the municipality’s agents and the injured party; and (4) that party’s justifiable reliance on the municipality’s affirmative undertaking” (Cuffy v City of New York, 69 NY2d 255, 260 …). * * *

Generally, the “decision to arrest an individual involves the exercise of discretion . . . and thus is cloaked with governmental immunity” … . However, here, in the face of what was, in effect, a temporary order of protection, the defendant police officers became, at a minimum, “obligated to respond and investigate” … . Therefore, the Village defendants have not conclusively established that their actions were purely discretionary … . Boyd v Village of Mamaroneck, 2026 NY Slip Op 02239, Second Dept 4-15-26

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for insight into what constitutes a “special relationship” between a plaintiff and a municipality and when a municipality is protected from liability in negligence by governmental function immunity.

 

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