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Town Could Not Be Liable for Discretionary Judgment Made by EMT (Third Dept).

The Third Department determined that an EMT employed by the town made a discretionary judgment that plaintiff’s decedent did not need life support during transport to the hospital.  Plaintiff’s decedent’s condition worsened during the trip and he died a week later.  Because the EMT’s judgment was discretionary, the town could not be held liable:

The Court of Appeals recently held that when a municipality provides emergency first responder services in response to a 911 call for assistance, as the Town did here by dispatching its paramedic, “it performs a governmental function[, rather than a proprietary one,] and cannot be held liable unless it owed a ‘special duty’ to the injured party” … .  A plaintiff generally must first establish the existence of a special duty before it becomes necessary for the court to address whether the governmental function immunity defense applies …, but the special relationship issue is irrelevant where the government action in question is discretionary … .  “Government action, if discretionary, may not be a basis for liability, while ministerial actions may be, but only if they violate a special duty owed to the plaintiff, apart from any duty to the public in general” … .  Discretionary authority involves “the exercise of reasoned judgment which could typically produce different acceptable results whereas a ministerial act envisions direct adherence to a governing rule or standard with a compulsory result” … .

Although the record here at least arguably contains factual issues concerning whether the Town voluntarily assumed a duty to decedent or plaintiff, thereby creating a special duty …, we need not address that question because the Town’s actions were discretionary.  The Town’s paramedic exercised his discretion in making medical determinations concerning decedent’s condition … . DiMeo… v Rotterdam Emergency Medical Services, Inc, 516264, 3rd Dept 10-31-13

 

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