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NEW YORK DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER FATHER, A KENTUCKY RESIDENT, IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION: THE COUPLE HAD NOT LIVED TOGETHER IN NEW YORK STATE FOR 23 YEARS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined New York did not have jurisdiction over father, a Kentucky resident, in this divorce action. The couple had last lived in New York in 1995 and had resided in Kentucky from 2003 to 2015:

Assuming, without deciding, that the wife established one of the predicates for jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (b), we find that the quality and nature of the husband’s activities in New York were such that it would be unreasonable and unfair to require him to defend an action in this state. Although the parties married in New York in 1991 and resided here until 1995, they have not resided together in this state in over 23 years. From 2003 until 2015, the parties resided together in Kentucky, where, at the time of commencement of this action, the husband was employed as a university professor and the parties owned real property. With the husband’s consent, the wife moved to New York with the parties’ son  in August 2015 and, as vaguely asserted by the wife, the husband has visited them in New York. The parties have not rented or purchased a home in New York. Rather, the wife and the son have lived rent-free with the wife’s parents, with the husband providing additional financial support. In our view, the husband’s contacts with New York are insufficient to warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him … .Accordingly, Supreme Court should have granted the husband’s motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Crosby v Crosby, 2019 NY Slip Op 08469, Third Dept 11-21-19

 

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