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Validity of Easement for Access to Lake Affirmed

In affirming Supreme Court’s determination that the relevant deed allowed recreational use of a parcel of land (parcel 4) for access to a lake, and Supreme Court’s order to remove a fence which blocked access, the Third Department explained the relevant legal principles as follows:

“[T]he construction of a  deed, including  any  easements  set  forth  therein,  is generally  a question of law for the court, with extrinsic evidence being considered only if there are ambiguities”….  As owners  in the subdivision, plaintiffs’ deed sets forth various rights regarding parcel 4, including swimming privileges, docking privileges and – as relevant here – recreational  privileges. The recreational right is broadly set forth as having “the right to use, for recreational purposes, Parcel #4.” Significantly, this is not a  right merely  to cross parcel 4 to reach the lake. Consistent with the expansive right granted, subdivision owners exercised the recreational right in sundry manners, such as having picnics in various places on parcel 4 or placing chairs on the parcel to enjoy the view. Once on parcel 4, there is no relevant limitation – other than reasonableness and safety – as to where on the parcel subdivision owners  exercised their recreational rights (see generally Bruce and Ely, The Law of Easements and Licenses in Land, Location and Dimensions  of  Easements  §  7:3).  Jankowski v Lake Forest Homeowners, Inc, 516015, 3rd Dept 6-27-13

 

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