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Retroactive Transfer of Liability to Special Fund Proper

The Third Department affirmed the board’s determination that retroactive transfer of liability to the Special Fund to a time within seven years of the underlying injury was proper:

Pursuant to Workers’ Compensation Law § 25-a, liability is transferred to the Special Fund “when an application to reopen a closed case is made more than seven years from the date of injury and more than three years after the last payment of compensation” (…see Workers’ Compensation Law § 25-a [1]).  Here, there is no dispute that these conditions have been met and the only issue before us is whether the Board properly transferred liability to the Special Fund retroactively to a period of time prior to the lapse of seven years following claimant’s injury.

While the retroactive transfer of liability to the Special Fund is limited to no longer than two years prior to the date of the application to reopen (see Workers’ Compensation Law § 25-a [1-a]…), there is no statutory requirement that there be a seven year lapse from the date of a claimant’s injury prior to the date of a retroactive transfer of liability (see Workers’ Compensation Law § 25-a [1-a]).  Accordingly, we conclude that the Board’s determination, that Workers’ Compensation Law § 25-a does not preclude a retroactive transfer of liability to the Special Fund to a time period within seven years of the underlying injury, is not unreasonable, irrational or inconsistent with the purpose of the statute …, and the Board has set forth sufficient reasons for no longer following any prior decisions to the contrary. Canfora v Goldman Sachs…, 515529, 3rd Dept 10-3-13

 

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