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“Presumption of Compensability” Applied

The decedent was working, driving a truck, when his truck struck a toll booth. There was evidence the decedent had a stroke, either just before or after the accident. In affirming the validity of the claim, the Third Department explained the application of the “presumption of compensability:”

…[W]e reject the employer’s assertion that claimant failed to meet her burden of establishing a casually related death. “Pursuant to Workers’ Compensation Law § 21 (1), a presumption of compensability exists where, as here, an unwitnessed or unexplained injury occurs during the course of the affected worker’s employment”… . As relevant here, the statutory presumption is applicable where either a stroke occurs during work … or where the onset of stroke symptoms occurs during work … . If the presumption is applicable, a claimant is not required “‘to come forward, in the first instance, with prima facie medical evidence of a causal relationship between’ [the] injury and [the] employment” … . * * *Inasmuch as decedent clearly had an accident while working, and it was either the stroke that caused the accident or the accident that caused the stroke, the Board properly applied the presumption that decedent’s injury was causally related to his employment (see Workers’ Compensation Law § 21 [1]…). Matter of Stevenson v Yellow Roadway Corporation…, 516077, 3rd Dept 2-20-14

 

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