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Negligence of Dog Owners In Calling A Dog Which Ran Into Bicyclist’s Path Is Actionable

Over a two-justice dissent, the First Department determined a lawsuit alleging the negligence of dog owners could go forward.  Plaintiff, a bicyclist, was injured when plaintiffs caused their dog to run into plaintiff’s path. After noting a change in the Court of Appeals’ approach to animal-caused injuries that are not the result of vicious propensities, the court wrote:

Recently, however, the Court of Appeals revisited Bard and Petrone when it decided an appeal of Hastings (94 AD3d 1171). In reversing the grant of summary judgment to the defendants, the Court recognized that an accident caused by an animal’s “aggressive or threatening behavior” is “fundamentally distinct” from one caused by an animal owner’s negligence in permitting the animal from wandering off the property where it was kept (21 NY3d 122, 125 [2013]). The Court stated that the consequence of a blanket rule against negligence claims in cases where animals displayed no vicious propensities “would be to immunize defendants who take little or no care to keep their livestock out of the roadway or off of other people’s property” (id.). * * *

Defendants’ actions can be likened to those of two people who decide to toss a ball back and forth over a trafficked road without regard to a bicyclist who is about to ride into the ball’s path. If the cyclist collided with the ball and was injured, certainly the people tossing the ball would be liable in negligence. Simply put, this case is different from the cases addressing the issue of injury claims arising out of animal behavior, because it was defendants’ actions, and not the dog’s own instinctive, volitional behavior, that most proximately caused the accident. Doerr v Goldsmith, 2013 NY slip Op 06442, 1st Dept 10-3-13

 

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