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HAIL Act Regulating Taxi Cabs and Livery Vehicles in New York City Does Not Violate Home Rule Section of State Constitution

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Piggot, held that the so-called HAIL Act, which regulates taxi cabs and livery vehicles in New York City, was not an unconstitutional special law in violation of the Home Rule Clause of the New York State Constitution because the statute benefits all New Yorkers, not just New York City residents:

At issue on this appeal is the constitutionality of chapter 602 of the Laws of 2011, as amended by chapter 9 of the Laws of 2012 (“HAIL Act”), which regulates medallion taxicabs (or “yellow cabs”) and livery vehicles, vital parts of New York City’s transportation system. The Act’s stated aim is to address certain mobility deficiencies in the City of New York, namely: the lack of accessible vehicles for residents and non-residents with disabilities; the dearth of available yellow cabs in the four boroughs outside Manhattan (“outer boroughs”), where residents and non-residents must instead rely on livery vehicles; and the sparse availability of yellow cab service outside Manhattan’s central business district. * * *

We conclude that the HAIL Act addresses a matter of substantial State concern. This is not a purely local issue. Millions of people from within and without the State visit the City annually. Some of these visitors are disabled, and will undoubtably benefit from the increase in accessible vehicles in the Manhattan central business district and in the outer boroughs. The Act is for the benefit of all New Yorkers, and not merely those residing within the City. Efficient transportation services in the State’s largest City and international center of commerce is important to the entire State. The Act plainly furthers all of these significant goals. Greater New York Taxi Association v State of New York…, Nos 98, 99, 100, CtApp, 6-6-13

 

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