Local Law Imposing Residency Restrictions Upon a Level One Sex Offender Who Was No Longer Subject to State Sex-Offender Residency Restrictions Preempted by Implication—The Body of State Law Regulating Sex Offenders Evinced the State’s Intent to “Occupy the Field”
The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott, determined that a Nassau County Local Law which prohibited registered sex offenders from residing within 1000 feet of a school was preempted by the body of state law regulating the residency of sex offenders. In this case, the defendant was adjudicated a level one sex offender (the lowest level of “danger” to the community) and had been discharged from parole. The state sex-offender residency restrictions no longer applied to him. The Court of Appeals held that the body of law enacted by the state in this area, by implication, evinced an intent to “occupy the field” and therefore local governments did not have the power to enact their own sex-offender residency laws:
Although a local government is constitutionally empowered to enact local laws relating to the welfare of its citizens through its police power, it is prohibited from exercising that power through the adoption of local laws that are inconsistent with the New York State Constitution or any general law of the State (see NY Const, art IX, § 2 [c]; Municipal Home Rule Law § 10 [1] [i]; [ii] [1] [a] [12]). This doctrine of preemption is a significant restriction on a local government’s home rule powers because although localities are “invested with substantial powers both by affirmative grant and by restriction on State powers in matters of local concern, the overriding limitation of the preemption doctrine embodies ‘the untrammeled primacy of the Legislature to act . . . with respect to matters of State concern'” … . * * *
The doctrine of field preemption prohibits a municipality from exercising a police power “when the Legislature has restricted such an exercise by preempting the area of regulation” … . Although field preemption may be “express” as evidenced by the Legislature’s stated directive, it may also “be implied from a declaration of State policy by the Legislature . . . or from the fact that the Legislature has enacted a comprehensive and detailed regulatory scheme in a particular area” … . Intent to preempt the field may “be implied from the nature of the subject matter being regulated and the purpose and scope of the State legislative scheme, including the need for State-wide uniformity in a given area” … . * * *
The defendant in this appeal is a designated level one sex offender, is not on probation or parole, nor is he subject to conditional release or PRS. None of the [state] provisions that even touch upon residency or placement apply to him. …[T]hat does not mean that the State has delegated to local governments the duty of enacting residency laws concerning registered sex offenders. Nor does it mean … that “the Legislature has chosen to limit its regulations over sex offenders and not to enact a comprehensive legislative scheme in the area concerning the residency restrictions of sex offenders who are not on parole, probation, subject to conditional discharge or seeking public assistance” … . Rather, it is clear that the State has been continuously active in this field and, as such, it is evident that the State has chosen to occupy it. People v Diack, 2015 NY Slip Op 01376, CtApp 2-17-15